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The Justice of the Pieces: 
Liberalism, Democracy, and the Globalization of the Nation-State 
Abstract 
For Carl Schmitt, sovereign rule and the nature of sovereign power are conceptions of 
what makes a state political. The sovereign nation is legitimated by its conceptualized (or 
real) democratic foundation, but is maintained by the absolutist nature of its sovereign 
power. Similarly, Hobbesian sovereignty presupposes the notion of state as that body by 
which sovereign power governs. I argue that the international community is formulated 
on a Hobbesian conception of nation-state sovereignty, which embodies a contradiction: 
the political value of nations as (state) individuals, and the liberal value of a common 
humanity. This contradiction is mirrored in the tension that exists within the state 
between democracy and liberalism, and is central to Western international political theory 
and policy. The validity of Hobbesian-based conceptions of nation-state sovereignty are 
being pulled into question. Nation-states, I argue, are increasingly required to use the 
sovereign decision in order to justify their sovereignty, as defined by the 'nation'. I 
attempt to show why the present international system, as a contributor to the forces of 
liberal globalization, naturally leads us to question state sovereignty, which ensures the 
continued use of violent sovereign power. 
iii 
Introduction 
Many of the more concrete normative problems in international social and political 
theory "implicate relatively abstract issues about the significance of sovereignty" (Beitz, 
1991: 23 7). Arguments about human rights, international humanitarian and distributive 
justice, economic permeability, and so forth, are able to proceed only so far before being 
faced with the question of the foundations and significance of state sovereignty as a norm 
of international conduct. The nature of sovereignty and its location in the nation are far 
from clear in its real-life manifestations. As a highly conceptual entity, sovereignty's 
resistance to precise definition is magnified when each existing (or previously existing) 
nation is contrasted with another, when each state's sovereignty is compared to another's. 
My first goal is to illuminate the theoretical basis on which these manifestations are 
founded. The persistence of the questions of sovereignty, both theoretical and practical, 
and their resistance to simple resolution, drive what I present here. 
For Thomas Hobbes, sovereignty is the condition of societal relations and is the absolute 
power of one over others. Sovereign rule is theoretically legitimated, for Hobbes, by its 
instituted power through the social contract between individuals. Men fear one another 
and lay down the power of their wills in exchange for sovereign protection; the power of 
the sovereign results from the (complete) submission of his subjects (Hobbes, De Give: 
II, 6, II). Sovereign rule protects one subject from another and protects the sovereign 
domain (the city, the subjects) from external threat. Hobbes' sovereign is "the final 
1 
authority within the political community, and his authority is unlimited, either by law or 
by religion or by conventional morality: he is at once the source of law and above the 
law" (Berent, 2000: 2). He may do whatever he chooses, for or to the people; the legal 
sovereign is the "legislative will which is omnipotent, supreme and absolute, issuing 
positive law overriding all other forms of obligation ... of the citizens" (Lee, 1990:8). 
Hobbesian sovereignty is predominantly what Carl Schmitt would call political 
sovereignty. 
Schmitt argues that there is a fundamental contradiction between the political and the 
liberal. Liberalism is unable to be political. Politics requires the establishment of a 
bordered society in which 'the people' are distinguished from 'the foreigners' 
(respectively, the 'friends' from the 'enemies'). 1 He writes, "[t]he specific political 
distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend 
and enemy".2 Liberalism, by contrast, values universality, the equality of 'humanity', and 
the private domain; it is, Schmitt concludes, anti-political by nature. Furthermore, this 
contradiction between the political and the liberal is witnessed in the increased tension 
between sovereignty through the nation and the 'universalization' of ideas and values 
through globalization. 
1 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923) (Ellen Kennedy, trans.) 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), hereafter cited in the text as (Schmitt, CPD: page). 
2 Carl Schmitt, Concept of the Political (1932) (George Schwab, trans.) (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976), hereafter cited in the text as (Schmitt, 
COP: page). 
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Post-Hobbesian sovereignty presupposes the notion of state (of a structure which 
monopolizes the use of legitimate, coercive violence) as that body by which sovereign 
power governs. Insofar as Hobbes' conception of sovereignty values the individual as 
fundamental (and equal to others in a state of nature and under sovereign rule) and paves 
the way for the legal 'state', he is rightly seen as a founder of liberal thought. Insofar as 
his sovereign holds power by representing the collective will of his subjects, whom he 
determines, Hobbes' sovereignty may be understood as a (Schmittian) political concept. 
The nature of Hobbesian sovereignty, which persists in present theories of state and the 
predominant working models of international relations, is political. It therefore readily 
defies the liberal value placed on 'humanity' !human equality. Furthermore, it exists at a 
macro-level in theories of international organization of sovereign states and is played out 
through claims to 'nationhood'. 
This type of sovereignty, Hobbesian sovereignty, is being challenged by the forces of 
globalization, under the system's thrust toward a neo-liberal humanity of consumers. At 
the same time, claims to 'nationhood' and nationalist movements (as demonstrative of 
Schmitt's 'the political') continue to rise. I argue that nation-states, under such a tension, 
are increasingly required to justify their existence through the exercise of their sovereign 
power, through the formation of the 'nation'. Furthermore, I argue that the international 
community is formulated on a Hobbesian conception of nation-state sovereignty. 
3 
In the first chapter, "Democracy and Exclusion in Hobbes", I examine Thomas Hobbes' 
theory of sovereign power: its formation, its end, and its content. I then turn to Carl 
Schmitt's conception of sovereign rule and the nature of sovereign power as that which 
makes a state political. I outline his critique of the liberal constitutional state and will 
present his conclusions about a properly political state entity. In this way, I argue that 
the 'democracy' he desires is another mode of conceptually representational but 
practically authoritarian rule, much like Hobbesian sovereignty. Schmitt's 'democracy' 
is not republican representationalism, but absolutist sovereignty justified by its 
establishment through the constituent power of the people. I will argue that, although he 
criticizes Hobbes' slide (back) into liberalism, and although Hobbes says that he favours 
a monarchical system of rule, the 'democracy' Schmitt writes of is the best way to 
understand the Hobbesian sovereign state. In other words, I will show that not only is 
Hobbes' sovereign power properly 'political', as Schmitt would have it, it is also properly 
political in Schmittian democratic terms, that is, representational, absolutist, and 
exclusionary. 
In the next chapter, "The Nation, The People, and Absolutist Democracy", I establish the 
nation as a creation of the state and argue that this is always the case, even though the 
nation, a conceptual embodiment of the people, must always be (pre-philosophically) 
understood to pre-exist the state. I take up Schmitt's notion of a 'people' and Hobbes' 
notion of 'the city' to assert the democratic (political) nature of the present conception of 
the 'nation'. I will characterize the sovereignty of a people through the 'nation' as based 
4 
on the sovereignty ofthe 'civil person' (Hobbes), but as privileging the sovereign power 
of the group, which must be defined. The sovereign nation is legitimated by its 
conceptualized (or real) democratic foundation, but is maintained by the absolutist nature 
of its sovereign power. I will examine the shift from a sovereign man as the 
representative of the state to a sovereign 'people' as represented by the nation 
(symbolically) and the leader (practically). I will assert that the nation can and must be 
understood as a location of the sovereign decision (of inclusion in 'the people' or 
exclusion from it), and as the creation of the sovereign decision. 
The model of international relations imagined in the Western (non-Arabic) world 
assumes an initial state of nature between nations, then contracted to one another to 
maintain peace and economic stability for all parties. The basis of this conception 
presently embodies a contradiction: the political value of nations as (state) individuals, 
and the liberal value of a common humanity. This contradiction is therefore central to 
Western international political theory and policy, in which the validity of Hobbesian-
based conceptions of nation-state sovereignty are being pulled into question. I argue, in 
the final chapter, "State Legitimation and the International Order", that this is the case 
because of the power of globalizing forces3 together with the incompatibility of politics 
and liberalism. Nation-states, I will argue, are increasingly required to use the sovereign 
decision in order to justify their sovereignty, as defined by the 'nation'. The increasing 
3 I'm thinking here of the market, the United Nations, the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, and so forth. 
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tension between the thrust of globalization and the pull of the nation is visible in 
intellectual discourse (i.e., cosmopolitan vs. communitarian citizenship theories), in 
localized social movements (i.e., various state nationalisms), as well as in state policy 
(i.e., on immigration, on refugees, on funding for those most vulnerable). 
I hope to show why the present international system, as a contributor to the forces of 
globalization, naturally leads us to question state sovereignty. If we understand the 
system to be based on a conception of (Hobbesian) sovereign nation-states, and if we 
understand such states to be legitimated by their (Schmittian) political nature, then it 
becomes easier to see why their sovereignty might be questioned, given the strength of 
the 'universalizing' forces of globalization. The ability of the sovereign forces of 
globalization to assert their rule remains to be seen. 
6 
Chapter I 
Democracy and Exclusion in Hobbes 
Representation means to render something invisible publicly visible and hence present. 
-- Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre4 
In his lectures on Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, Carl Schmitt accuses Hobbes of properly 
describing the theoretical justification for a political state, but negating it by allowing the 
'voices' of the citizens to be heard- that is, he accuses him of negating the political with 
liberal values.5 He holds that Hobbes' conception of sovereign power is correctly 
formulated and that Hobbes' preference for a monarchical rule is sound and politically 
justified. But his 'thoughtfulness', says Schmitt, leads him to accept the liberal value of 
individualism, and thus parliamentary constitutionalism, by which the political state 
negates itself. 
These lectures were delivered in 1938 and they echo the conception of sovereignty 
presented in his Political Theology (1922).6 Political Theology is a primary reference for 
those studying Schmitt's theory of sovereignty, but in the period between 1922 and 1938, 
4 Carl Schmitt. Verfassungslehre (Constitutional Theory) (1928) (Berlin: Duncker & 
Hum blot, 1957), hereafter cited in the text as (Schmitt, CT: page). 
5 Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and 
failure of a political symbol (1938) (George Schwab and Ema Hilfstein, trans.), 
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996). 
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Schmitt's tune had changed significantly. In his The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 
( 1923) (Schmitt, CPD: 9), he is still concerned with the dismantling and systematic 
criticism of liberalism and, more specifically, of liberal constitutionalism as a mode of 
state governance. Liberal constitutionalism, he holds, is anti-political, because it refuses 
a conception of sovereign rule and sovereign power (the ultimate concrete moment of the 
political). As Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde notes: "the political [for Schmitt] does not 
consist in a determined sphere of objects, but rather is a public relationship between 
people, a relationship marked by a specific degree of association or dissociation which 
can potentially be linked to the distinction between friend and enemy" (BockenfOrde, 
1998: 38). Schmitt's view of liberal constitutionalism, which I will detail below, asserts 
that a conception of sovereignty reflective of the political cannot be maintained by liberal 
forms of government. 
For Schmitt, the sovereign is whoever has the capacity to violate the legal order because 
any absolute form of government, monarchic or democratic, implies a sovereign prince or 
people who stands above the law (Schmitt, CT: 227).7 This is in stark contrast to the 
6 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (1922) 
(George Schwab, trans.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), hereafter cited in the text 
as (Schmitt, PT: page). 
7 Democracy is, for Schmitt, a mode of legitimating power, in this case, through 'the 
people'. The power of the people is absolute, conceptually speaking, so long as it is 
understood to retain sovereignty- the power to decide. Absolute democracy is therefore 
a system of governance which retains its foundation, legitimation, and sovereignty 
through the people, but which, practically speaking, is absolutist in the nature of its rule. 
That is, sovereignty is exercised by a representative of the people, over the people who 
are its conceptual foundation. 
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liberal ideal of state as the subjection of state power to the rule of law, which expels, 
Schmitt holds, sovereignty from its proper domain, ridding itself of sovereign power 
(Cristi, 1998: 191). For Schmitt, constitutional democracy (liberal democracy) is the 
combination of two mutually negating components: liberal constitutionalism (rule of 
law) and political democracy (absolutism). It is, therefore, a self-undermining, self-
contradictory project (Cristi, 1998: 191). For Schmitt, the absolute normativity of the 
liberal rule of law constitutes an untenable fiction of state. Liberalism tries to erase the 
political and the state through legal maneuvers and avoidance. In truth, acts of 
sovereignty (violations of the legal order by the sovereign) will inevitably occur, but 
these are more justifiable when they are conceived as grounded in the constituent power 
of the people (Cristi, 1998: 192). By 1923, Schmitt has, it seems, faced the 1919 
Weimar Constitution in Germany, and has dealt not only with its liberal overtones, but 
also with its formation as the result of a more or less democratic movement of the 
German people. What he concludes is that democracy is another way for a state to be 
understood as an instance of 'the political'. 8 
Schmitt's "aversion to democracy" is not, however, forfeited by the recognition of 
democratic sovereignty; we should not understand him to have undergone a "democratic 
conversion" (Cristi, 1998: 191). Instead, we ought to understand him as having his 'back 
8 For a detailed discussion of the Weimar Constitution and its influence on Schmitt's 
thought, see Rena to Critsi, "Carl Schmitt on Sovereignty and Constituent Power", in 
David Dyzenhaus, ed. Politics as Law: Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism. (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 179-195. 
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against a wall'. The Weimar Constitution could not be ignored, and Schmitt responds by 
allowing a notion of democratic sovereignty into his theory. But faced with a possible 
(theoretical) democratic revolution willing to appeal to the constituent power (of the 
people), Schmitt tries to disarm this power. He ties the doctrine of constituent power 
(that the power of the public will constitutes the foundation of the state) to the principle 
of representation to ensure that established sovereignty is able to restrain democracy, 
rather than enhance it. This, then, is not a liberal democracy (a term which he still 
strongly opposes as consisting of two mutually negating parts). What he favours in The 
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy is an "authoritarian version of democracy" 
(Bielefeldt, 1998: 23) in which he employs the notion of 'representation' to maintain a 
dictatorial authority within the state. This will be spelled out more carefully in what 
follows. 
In this chapter, I will review, in detail, Thomas Hobbes' theory of sovereign power: its 
formation, its end, and its content. I will then turn to Schmitt's conception of sovereign 
rule and the nature of sovereign power as that which makes a state political. I will outline 
his critique of the liberal constitutional state and will present his conclusions about a 
properly political state entity. This will include an examination of the necessity of 
'political unity' and 'substantive homogeneity', as well as a close reading of what is 
meant by 'representation'. The 'democracy' he desires is another mode of conceptually 
representational but practically dictatorial rule. What I want to show is that, although he 
criticizes Hobbes' slide into liberalism, and although Hobbes says that he favours a 
10 
monarchical system of rule, the 'democracy' Schmitt writes of is the best way to 
understand the Hobbesian sovereign state. In other words, I will show that not only is 
Hobbes' sovereign power properly 'political', as Schmitt would have it, it is also properly 
political in Schmittian democratic terms, that is, representational, absolutist, and 
exclusionary. 
1.1 Hobbes 
Thomas Hobbes' political work (Leviathan; De Cive) is concerned with asking how 
political order is possible, given the disintegration of traditional justifications for the 
legitimacy of supreme political power. He is prompted largely by the condition of civil 
war, in part the result of one political faction's refusal to accept the king's view of legal 
order as right. In his famous Chapter 13 of the Leviathan,9 Hobbes addresses, with his 
description of the "state of nature", an imaginary state of emergency, in which sovereign 
power has failed and societal order has collapsed. His work is, for the most part, the 
prescription of sovereign mechanisms to preserve state order. In what follows, I detail 
the formation, end, and power of sovereign rule. 
1.1.1 The State of Nature 
Hobbes begins with an analysis of the individual because he acknowledges the 
impossibility of conceiving of society at all without first understanding the nature of its 
9 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) ( J.C.A. Gaskin, ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), hereafter cited in the text as (Hobbes, Levia.: Part, Chapter, Section). 
11 
most fundamental parts. As such, human individuals are first analyzed in abstraction 
from any specific social context (King, 1974: 165). Because the condition of man 
without society, Hobbes holds, is one of war of "every one against every one" (Hobbes, 
Levia.: I, XIV, 4), each person is governed by his10 own reason. In this state, there is 
nothing he cannot use to preserve his life against his enemies (who are just about 
everyone)- everyone has the right or liberty (power) to everything, including another's 
body. So long as this 'right to everything' continues, there is no security for any one to 
live out their full lives. It is from this fact that Hobbes derives the "Fundamental Law of 
Nature", namely, "that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of 
obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and 
advantages of war" (Hobbes, Levia.: I, XIV, 4). We are thus to understand the first and 
fundamental law of nature to read "seek peace and follow it", and its subsidiary branch, 
the sum of the right of nature, to read "by all means ... defend [yourself]" (Hobbes, 
Levia.: I, XIV, 4). 11 But there is, therefore, a second law of nature, "that a man be 
willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall 
think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much 
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself' (Hobbes, Levia.: 
10 I will use 'he', 'his', 'him', etc., when discussing the sovereign, his subjects, and 
people in general when referring to Hobbes' work because I suspect that he did not mean 
for these concepts to be inclusive, although women were clearly subject, for him, to 
sovereign rule. My use of exclusive language in this context is deliberate and not a 
function of insensitivity. 
12 
I, XIV, 5). So long as all men have rights to all things, they live in a condition of war. 
Natural law is fulfilled when a man is open to living in peace when possible (when the 
right to war remains),12 and when he is willing to lay down his right to all things to do so. 
Lower-order creatures, Hobbes tells us, are naturally "political animals", and can live in 
communal societies without the presence of a coercive power. Men, however, cannot 
agree to live together without a covenant13 (Hobbes, Levia.: II, XVII, 6-12). As 
reasonable creatures, individuals must be understood to be unable, says Hobbes, in 
general, to reach consensus on issues where all they have to base their decisions on are 
their individual powers of reason. Endless and sometimes destructive disputes should be 
expected in this state. It is not in man's nature to live together, and a "common power" is 
therefore required to guide them and to act for the common good (Hobbes, Levia.: II, 
XVII, 12). Hobbes holds that a coercive power is necessary to keep human society 
secure. It is therefore necessary that the right of the Sword be possessed by the 
man/counsel (sovereign) who has supreme power in the city. The right to punish (and to 
coerce by the Sword) is the sovereign right to compel all men to do what the sovereign 
11 For Hobbes, rights are liberties or 'powers' free of external impediments; laws are 
'precepts', or general rules, "found out by nature". Much like liberty and obligation are 
inconsistent for Hobbes, so too are right and law. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, I, XIV, 2-
3. 
12 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive. (1642) (Howard Warrender, ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983): Part II, Chapter 5, Section I. Hereafter cited in the text as (Hobbes, De Cive: 
Part, Chapter, Section). 
13 
wills. There is no greater power than the right of the Sword (De Cive, II, 6, VI), largely 
because it gives the power to coerce through the fear of death (as punishment). 14 
Still, individuals ought, even given their penchant for destructive dispute, to be 
understood to agree that peace and order are preferable modes of living to chaos and 
strife (Dyzenhaus, 1998: 6). Individual submission to a sovereign power is thus rational, 
regardless of the content of the sovereign judgment. Sovereign judgment should be 
expressed through the issuing of positive law. The nature of positive law is the nature of 
the sovereign; the sovereign is the law and is outside of the law as its creator. Positive 
law has a determined content and thus, for Hobbes, evades disputes as to what the law is, 
preserving the peace. He holds that order must be established by the sovereign for 
individual liberty to be possible (liberty being that freedom given to individuals in 
ordered society by the 'silence of the law'). 
Given individual agreement on the value of peace and order, the establishment of a 
common power is a rational endeavour. To erect such a power, Hobbes holds, it is 
therefore necessary for men to "confer all their power and strength upon one man, or 
assembly of men, to bear their person ... and therein to submit their wills, every one to 
13 Hobbes defines a covenant as a contract in which one ofthe contractors delivers his 
contracted portion and trusts the other to perform/deliver his portion at some determinate 
time afterward. Alternately, both parts may contract now and deliver later (Hobbes, 
Levia.: I, XIV, 10). 
14 Correlative to this is the right to judge because the rights to judge and to execute 
punishment must be in one location (De Cive, II, 6, VIII). 
14 
his will, and their judgments, to his judgment" (Hobbes, Levia.: II, XVII, 13). 15 What 
results is more than consent or concord of the people with the common power, "it is a real 
unity of them all, in one and the same person" (Hobbes, Levia.: II, XVII, 13).16 By 
joining together in this manner, a commonwealth (civitas) is formed- 'the great 
Leviathan'. The 'instituted' commonwealth, its essence and definition is, for Hobbes, 
... one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenant with one another, 
have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and 
means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense. 17 
The sovereign is at once the embodiment of the multitude, their creation, and the man 
counsel) who rules them. Once one has submitted to the will of a man or counsel, the use 
of one's strength and will cannot be denied him (them). Hobbes calls this mutual 
submission of strengths and wills to one location a 'union', embodied in the sovereign 
person. In a union, where all individual powers have been laid down before the leader, 
the leader is sovereign. 
1.1.2 The Sovereign 
A 'union' or commonwealth formed by 'institution' (social contract) may equally be 
called a 'city', a 'civil society', and a 'civil person'. As all rights of individuals have 
been laid down before the leader, and as only he who 'stands for the will of all' is to be 
15 Compare with Hobbes' De Cive: II, 5, VI. 
16 Compare with Hobbes' De Cive: II, 5, VII. 
17 Hobbes, Levia.: I, XVII, 13. 
15 
counted, a 'city' is therefore one person (or counsel) whose will is the will of each and 
every one (Hobbes, De Cive: II, 5, IX). The 'political' is thus linked, though not 
essentially so, to a formation of representation on the part of the sovereign power. It is 
this individual (or counsel) who can and must use the strength and faculty of each 
individual to maintain the peace and "common defense". As such, each man/counsel 
constituting the city (to which each individual will has been subjected) has supreme 
power, chief command, and dominion- that is, sovereignty. For Hobbes, sovereignty is 
the power to decide, on matters of law, on matters of right, on matters of justice, and so 
forth. The power of the sovereign makes the individual afraid to break from and spoil 
the integrity of the union (Hobbes, De Cive: II, 5, VII-VIII). The reason for sovereignty 
is the peace and protection of the subjects, and whoever has sovereign power has the right 
to any means to achieve their peace and protection. Sovereignty is thus also the power to 
decide the mode and content of the societal order. That all rights are contained in one 
location is the 'essence of sovereignty', and it is the concentration of rights that 
distinguishes the Hobbesian sovereign from the subjects and from other modes of power. 
That all rights are contained in the sovereign is necessary: a division of power (right) 
leads, Hobbes says, to civil war (Hobbes, Levia.: 2, XVIII, 16). A power able, by right, 
to acquire the complete submission of subjects is Hobbes' prescription for sustainable 
order. The sovereign-subject relation is therefore one of covenant- subjects submit 
completely to the sovereign and obey him in return for protection, if and when it is 
needed. The covenant is among (between) subjects, above which the sovereign stands 
with absolute power, outside of any obligation or covenant, save the laws of nature. In 
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the subject's submission consists his obligation and his liberty - there is no obligation, 
Hobbes holds, without some act of one's own: by saying (vocally or tacitly) "I authorize 
all his actions", or from the understood intention to submit to the sovereign power for 
protection. Obligation grows from the fact that without obedience, the city's right is 
destroyed, as is the city. The sovereign (who is the city) exists, by rights, through the 
obedience of the subjects, and the sovereign may and should use violent coercion to 
ensure this. Obligation to the sovereign lasts only so long as his power, by which he is 
able to protect the subjects, lasts. 
The sovereign is, for Hobbes, the ultimate political power. But he is concerned that such 
a power in the wrong hands would have the opposite of the desired effect - the sovereign 
is only human, after all. His concern is primarily with the clash of public and private 
interest, and with the sovereign power to govern only in his own best interest. He 
concludes that it is in a monarchic rule that this problem is least troublesome: "Now in 
the monarchy, the private interest is the same with the public" (Hobbes, Levia.: 2, XIX, 
4). In other governmental forms, public and private interests always conflict with one 
another. The wealth, power, and prestige of a monarchy, he holds, are only the wealth, 
strength, and reputation of his subjects. The spiritual nature of the connection between 
the monarchic sovereign and the people prevents this public/private conflict of interest. 
"Sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth", from which the body (the members) 
derives its motion (Hobbes, Levia.: 2, XXI, 21). The 'office', as Hobbes terms it, or 
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administration of the city or state, should be thought of as the mind. But the 'command', 
the city itself, is the soul of the Leviathan, the seat of its passions (Hobbes, De Cive: II, 
6, XIX). The city, which is the sovereign, as composed of the subjects' wills, should 
ideally be represented by a monarch who, we are to understand, naturally embodies its 
soul. 
The tension in Hobbes' work, however, between individualism and political absolutism, 
is never fully resolved (Dyzenhaus, 1998: 7). The sovereign is legally and politically 
unconstrained, subject only to the laws of nature. But these, too, have their content 
determined by the sovereign. Individual rights (powers), for Hobbes, are always already 
included in the laws of nature, are derived from the laws of nature, and these are always 
already included or immanent in sovereign decreed positive law. The sovereign 
determines how the laws of nature will be played out under his authority. Moreover, we 
are clearly to understand that Hobbes' sovereign power is the representation of the 
collective subjects' powers. While subjects must submit, he clearly wants their 
obligation to be conceived as the result of their will, in the form of sovereign 
authorization via the social contract. When the sovereign negate a subject's rights, it is 
the subject himself who has authorized this: "for all that is done by him in virtue of his 
power, is done by the authority of every subject" (Hobbes, Levia.: 2, XXI, 19). 
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1.2 Schmitt 
Carl Schmitt's declared issues with liberalism are many18• His arguments include those 
holding that liberalism negates the state by holding that human nature is good, thereby 
directing itself against state intervention; that it does not deny the state, but holds a 
doctrine of individual primacy which leaves it unable to advance a positive theory of state 
or discover how to reform the state (Schmitt, COP: 61); that it has attempted to tie the 
political to the ethical and then 'subjugate' it to the economic, that is, to hide the political 
(Schmitt, COP: 61); that it uses the law as the legitimation of a specific status quo 
(particularly of social or economic power); that it is incapable/unwilling to distinguish 
between friend and enemy, which is a symptom of political end; that it destroys and is 
destroyed by democracy; and that political entities must sometimes demand the sacrifice 
of lives, which liberalism is unable to demand and remain consistent with its doctrine of 
individualism (Schmitt, COP: 70-71 ). What these all essentially reduce to, however, are 
permutations of a belief about human nature, a belief that simultaneously holds that 
liberalism does not reflect this human nature. Much like Hobbes, Schmitt holds that 
human beings are self-interested and, at least potentially, dangerous. 19 Unlike Hobbes, he 
holds that this makes them instinctively political (Schmitt, COP: 61)- that is, they 
understand social interaction to take place on a continuum between friends and enemies, 
18 See Carl Schmitt, Concept of the Political (1932) (George Schwab, trans.) (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976), for the most complete exposition of 
these. 
19 See above. 
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the latter of which, in extreme cases, they consider killable, when necessary.2° For 
Schmitt, 'the political' 21 is the realm in which 'friends' and 'enemies' are distinguished; it 
is a state of potential conflict. 'The political' distinguishes between concrete (not 
abstract) 'friends' and concrete 'enemies'.22 The enemy, for Schmitt, is not just a partner 
in conflict; the enemy is not a private adversary "whom one hates" (Schmitt, COP: 28). 
It (they) exists only when there is a potential fight/combat between two collectivities of 
people. The enemy is only ever a public enemy- an enemy to a collectivity of people 
and therefore public (Schmitt, COP: 28). "The high points of politics are simultaneously 
the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy" 
(Schmitt, COP: 67). The sovereign decision is the ultimate instance of this recognition 
and delineation. 
20 Since the sphere of the political is determined by the real possibility of an enemy, 
properly political ideas cannot start, Schmitt argues, from a point of "anthropological 
optimism" (Schmitt, COP: 64). Any genuine 'political' theory presupposes human nature 
to be evil- a problematic, dangerous, and dynamic being (Schmitt, COP: 61 ). "The 
political is a basic characteristic of human life; politics in this sense is destiny; therefore 
man cannot escape politics" (Strauss, NCOP: 94). 
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'The political' is a type of phenomenological description, for Schmitt, the extremes of 
which are 'friend' and 'enemy'. As explained by Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, the 
criterion of 'the political', as a phenomenon, is that is it can (possibly) lead to a concrete 
antagonism between 'friend' and 'enemy', which includes a readiness for actual conflict 
(war). See Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenfdrde, "The Concept of the Political: A Key to 
Understanding Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory", in David Dyzenhaus, ed. Politics 
as Law: Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 
p.38. 
22 He is not referring to "politics", although this can be an instance of 'the political'. 
Politics is only political when it embodies the antagonism between 'friend' and 'enemy', 
which, at least in the majority of domestic (international) contexts, is not the case. 
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What Schmitt calls the "extreme case" is the situation in which the 'friend'-'enemy' 
antagonism leads to concrete war (not just its possibility). 'The political' requires the 
possibility of the extreme case becoming reality and the ultimate political moment is the 
decision upon whether this situation has arrived. The extreme case seems to be the 
exception, Schmitt writes, since we are not continually in a state of concrete war; but far 
from negating it, the exceptional nature of the extreme case confirms its decisiveness. 
"War is still today the most extreme possibility" (Schmitt, COP: 35). The exception is 
decisive in its ability to reveal the crux of the matter. Only in actual conflict, which 
Schmitt terms the 'state of exception' ,23 can we see the extreme consequence of the 
political. If the focus of a state in normal circumstances is the assurance of total peace 
and security of the demos (people) within its territory, then the establishment of normal 
circumstances is the prerequisite for valid legal norms. Norms presuppose normal 
circumstances, and no norm can be valid in any situation of complete abnormality 
(Schmitt, COP: 46). That is, the validity of legal norms requires a situation of normalcy 
- in the case of a state, the total peace and security of the people and territory. The 
"extreme case" is the exception to such a norm, and the decision to suspend the set of 
normal circumstances is the ultimate political moment. 
23 What is translated by Strauss from German as the 'state of exception' is often translated 
to English as the 'state of emergency'. I will, for the most part, use the 'state of 
exception/emergency' because it most completely reflects the nature of Schmitt's take on 
actual conflict- both an exception to the rule and a time of emergency, for the state and 
for individuals. 
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But while Schmitt accuses Hobbes of sliding back into liberalism by allowing for the 
'silence of the law', that is, personal liberty, once the peaceful state is established, I think 
that Schmitt comes to many of the same conclusions Hobbes does about the nature of 
sovereign rule. 
1.2.1 The Sovereign 
For Schmitt, the commonly accepted view of sovereignty -that it is the highest original 
legal power of domination - is valid, but too abstract (Schmitt, PT: 5-6). It leaves aside 
the issue of the application of such a power in concrete terms: who decides the extreme 
case, when public peace and security are at risk? (Cristi, 1998: 181) It is here that we see 
the personalism and decisionism of Schmitt's sovereignty, as well as the unlimited power 
of sovereign rule in terms of the state of emergency/exception. 
For Schmitt, the overt presence of the political is inevitable as the expression of our 
human nature. It is this human nature which liberalism tries to manipulate and hide, 
turning the antagonisms of the political into normatively negative forces: immorality, 
irrationality, and so forth. Schmitt wants to undermine the liberal principle of the rule of 
law systematically (some hold that he is successful), and replace it with an authoritarian 
version of 'democracy', based upon the substantive homogeneity of the collective unity 
of the people (and not on the principles of participatory republicanism) (Bielefeldt, 1998: 
25). The 'rule of law', he holds, suggests that it is abstract normative principles and not 
concrete political positions/decisions which are primary. For Schmitt, normative 
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principles have no effect or relevance on human society without being interpreted by 
given agents and applied to given circumstances (Bielefeldt, 1998: 25). Particulars are 
always implicated in the implementation of normative principles, and this discredits, he 
holds, any claim to universal normative validity (Schmitt, PT: 10). This is most the case, 
or most clearly so, in the state of exception/emergency, in which the whole of a legal 
system is in jeopardy. The state of exception/emergency reveals the "factual primacy" 
(Bielefeldt, 1998: 25) of the 'rule of man' over the 'rule of law'. Hiener Bielefeldt holds 
that it is in Schmitt's state of emergency that political sovereignty breaks through "in the 
strong Hobbesian sense, that is, a sovereign decision uninhibited by any normative 
principles" (Bielefeldt, 1998: 26). Sovereign power, for Schmitt, is the ultimate instance 
of 'the political', as that which decides on the state of emergency/exception,24 and this 
decision is always made by a person, not by the rule of law.25 As Schmitt explains: 
The exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be 
characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. 
But it cannot be circumscribed and made to conform to a preformed law. 
It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that 
is, the whole question of sovereignty. The precise details of an emergency cannot be 
anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take place in such a case, especially when it 
is truly a matter of an extreme emergency and how it is to be eliminated. The 
preconditions as well as the content of a jurisdictional competence in such a case must 
necessarily be unlimited ... [The sovereign] decides whether there is an extreme 
emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it.26 
24 
"Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception." Carl Schmitt, PT: 9 (George 
Schwab, trans.). 
25 Hobbes also understands sovereignty in terms of the decision of a person on the state of 
exception (emergency). 
26 Schmitt, PT: 6-7. (George Schwab, trans.) 
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The question of sovereignty reduces to the question of who decides. For Schmitt, the 
political does not reside in war itself, but in the "mode of behaviour which is determined 
by this possibility" (Schmitt, COP: 37). A human grouping is always political insofar as 
it orients itself toward the possibility of the state of exception. A grouping of this kind is, 
therefore, always a "decisive human grouping", a "political entity" (Schmitt, COP: 38). 
Such a grouping is sovereign insofar as the decision with regard to the state of exception 
is always, necessarily, its own to make. The sovereign decision is the decision which 
decides when a people will enter into the state of exception, the extreme case; the power 
of sovereignty is, for Schmitt, located in this decision - in the decision to suspend the law 
in favour of the political, the decision to require the lives of the people in war or not to. 
The sovereign decision is the decision upon who, of a people, will live and who will die, 
and reflects the monopoly of decisive power within the state. By deciding upon when 
(and whether) to suspend the normal situation, the sovereign not only decides upon the 
state of exception (its constitution, necessary precursors, and so forth), the sovereign also 
decides upon the normal situation (its constitution, necessary precursors, and so forth). 
Indeed, a good indicator of sovereignty, for Schmitt, is the power to prevent a war if war 
is contrary to the sovereign's interests or wishes (Schmitt, COP: 39). The unification of 
an entity is necessary for its political existence - in the orientation toward the possibility 
of the state of exception, a unified political entity is essential - in this, it is sovereign 
(Schmitt, COP: 39). The social entity which determines the friend-enemy grouping and 
which decides on the state of exception is the political entity, the decisive entity (Schmitt, 
COP: 43), the sovereign. 
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The authority to decide on life and death is held, in monopoly, by the sovereign. Other 
non-political groups within the political entity (i.e., families), Schmitt holds, may have 
verdict over such matters, but only so long as the state of exception has not been decided 
upon by the sovereign; in such cases, any wars between family or "kinsfolk" would 
require suspension (Schmitt, COP: 47). Human groups which deny this as a consequence 
of being part of a political entity cease to be political groups by 'renouncing' the 
possibility of deciding upon the public enemy and its treatment: "By virtue of this power 
over the physical life of men, the political community transcends all other associations or 
societies" (Schmitt, COP: 47). The state, as the political entity of decision thus possesses 
an "enormous power" -the possibility of waging war and "thereby publicly disposing of 
the lives of men", through both the right to demand the readiness of its people to die and 
by the right to "unhesitatingly" kill enemies (Schmitt, COP: 46). 
1.2.2 The State 
As a political unity (a unity of power, i.e., decision), the state is factually given in 
Schmitt's political thought (Bockenforde, 1998: 42), first as a concentration of power, but 
also as the relative homogeneity of the people. The latter is the foundation and 
precondition of the unity of peace and the application of state power, which must first be 
accepted by the people. 
Schmitt tells us, in the introduction to his Concept of the Political, that the state is the 
political unity of a people (Schmitt, CP: 19). The state, therefore, as a political unity, is 
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the presupposition of constitutional validity. But the constitution is not a contract; rather, 
it is a sovereign decision regarding the type of form the political unity will take 
(Bockenforde, 1998: 43). We may understand that the state is a political unity, given his 
idea of 'the political', to mean that it is a pacified unity encompassing 'the political' 
(BockenfOrde, 1998: 38), a unity of 'friends'. But the integration of the political into the 
order of the state can come into question; once a political unity is established, it cannot be 
taken for granted, but must continually preserve and reconfirm itself through the actual 
cooperation of the people, otherwise the dictatorial nature of sovereignty must preside. 
Open or concealed civil war, for example, would dissolve state unity as a political unity. 
One must therefore stabilize the domestic order and rid it of potential or existing tensions 
and conflicts (BockenfOrde, 1998: 40), as well as potential and existing 'enemies'. 
Political unity is constituted and preserved by superseding tensions, antagonisms, and 
conflicting interests. For unity to be maintained, there needs to be the possibility of a 
final decision beyond further appeai.27 Sovereignty, as understood by Schmitt (as the 
ultimate decision on the exception) is, therefore, a necessary authority for the political 
state as a unity of peace. Furthermore, because the sovereign has an interest in the 
preservation of state unity and peace, any threat to these would require the use of 
sovereign dictatorial authority - unity would require artificial re-establishment or 
maintenance. But indeed, while we seem bid by Schmitt to understand the state as a 
27 Recall that Schmitt holds that sovereignty is not a monopoly of force, but of decision. 
Carl Schmitt, PT: 20 (George Schwab, trans.). 
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representation of a natural unity based upon some 'substantive homogeneity', he goes to 
great length to lay the sovereign at the foundation of the unified 'people'. 
Schmitt knows that his concept of sovereignty is an accurate depiction of an absolutist 
monarchy which, he says, "made the decision in the struggle of conflicting interests and 
coalitions and thereby founded the unity of the state" (Schmitt, PT: 62). He also knows 
that this conception runs contrary to normal conditions for democracy. This problem is 
resolved, however, in 1923 with The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, which can be 
understood as an attempt to reconcile the "unity that a people represents" with the 
"decisionist character" of sovereignty (Schmitt, PT: 62). This requires two things: the 
construction of a concrete unitary subject, 'the people', and "the elimination or 
eradication of heterogeneity" (Schmitt, CPD: 9). What characterizes democracy then, as 
I will develop further, is a mode of political rule in which the sovereign has the active 
role of declaring the nature of homogeneity and performing the task of concrete 
homogenization. 
1.2.3 The Political Community 
By defining sovereignty in terms of deciding the 'concrete exception', Schmitt posits its 
'content' as dependent upon the existence of the opponent or 'enemy' it must eliminate. 
The identity of such an enemy is always, for Schmitt, concrete - it is not specifiable 
juridically, but only as a function of 'the political'. That is, identifying the 'enemy' is not 
a mode oflegal exercise; the 'enemy' need not be legally defined 'crime', 'deviance', or 
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'inequity' as manifest in individuals or organizations. The enemy must be s/he or they 
who the sovereign deems to exist outside the homogeneity of the 'people'. The sovereign 
decision is not subject to the law; it is the law (and is thus outside of it, creating and 
directing it). Schmitt's approach to constitutional order does not hold it to be 
independent of what is 'outside' its boundaries. Proper constitutionalism is political- it 
reigns without thought for what is outside of it, save that it has designated the 'outside' 
space. Liberal constitutionalism is thus an attempt to maintain borders without 'political' 
distinctions. For Schmitt, the idea of liberal constitutionalism is flawed foremost in its 
attempt to excise the political by regulating the opponents to a given constitutional order 
and respecting them as citizens (i.e., by criminalization of citizen acts) as opposed to 
eliminating them as enemies. The "politics" of liberalism, insofar as it has any, focuses 
inward, Schmitt says, on the internal struggle of individuals against state power (Schmitt, 
COP: 70). Liberalism's incapacity/unwillingness to distinguish between friend and 
enemy is a symptom of political end (Schmitt, COP: 70). In addition, Schmitt holds that 
political entities must sometimes demand the sacrifice of lives. Liberalism is unable to 
demand this and remain consistent with its doctrine. The political is not derivable from 
the concept of liberal individualism- it is really a negation of the political (Schmitt, 
COP: 70-71). It seems that liberalism, according to Schmitt, could maintain a 'liberal' 
manner of handling states of exception/emergency, only so long as the instances of 
exception (emergency) or disorder affecting public security did not threaten the 
homogeneity of the state itself. 
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On this basis, Schmitt builds his arguments for the incompatibility of liberalism and 
democracy -liberalism's formal "equality of persons as persons" (Schmitt, CPD: 13) 
stands not only in opposition to, but also in the way of his democratic (political) equality 
"which can only be substantive and concrete, that is, political" (Ananiadis, 1999: 127). 
Where the basic political unit in liberalism is the person who is equal to all other persons 
(regardless of state, peoplehood, etc.), the Schmittian democracy holds the person to be 
equal only to all other persons with membership in his/her own political unit; 
"[h]umanity is not a political concept, and no political entity or society and no status 
corresponds to it" (Schmitt, COP: 55). In the opposition of these two concepts, Schmitt 
finds the 'crisis' of mass democracy: 
As democracy, modem mass democracy attempts to realize an identity of 
governed and governing, and thus it confronts parliaments as an inconceivable 
and outmoded institution. If democratic identity is taken seriously, then in an 
emergency, no other constitutional institution can withstand the sole criterion of 
the people's will, however it is expressed.28 
Schmitt's sovereign is provided, by democracy, with a new location from which to 
pursue his expulsion of heterogeneity, a new moment of in which to decide. 'The 
political' designates the character of social conflict because it makes reference to its 
potential for intense existential (concrete) antagonism between 'friend' and 'enemy'. The 
"paradigmatic constellation" (Preuss, 1999: 156) of this is a group's assertion of its 
'sameness' or 'identity' in contrast to the 'otherness' of a different group. From this, 
28 Schmitt, CPD: 15 (Ellen Kennedy, trans.) 
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Schmitt conceptualizes 'the people' (the democratic foundation of state) as having a 
political quality of their own. 
For Schmitt then, democracy is a particular form of political sovereignty. Ultimately, in 
a genuine democracy what is important is that there is sovereign authority of a collective 
unity of the people, facilitated by and resting on a "substantive homogeneity" (the 
people). The content of this homogeneity is of no importance, but it must be something 
particular, something substantive, "a medium through which a people can distinguish 
itself from other peoples and thus find its specific identity" (Bielefeldt, 1998: 27). 
"Political democracy cannot rest upon the indistinctiveness of all human beings; instead, 
it is based upon membership in a particular people"29 (Schmitt, op. cit. Bielefeldt, 1998: 
27). Liberal constitutionalism, however, has no substance; it sets up individual rights 
and the separation of powers to defend economic interests (Bielefeldt, 1998: 27). Its 
purpose is to "tame" political power through balancing various state institutions, none of 
which may exercise any strictly sovereign authority. Liberal constitutionalism "rests 
upon a peculiar method of linking, balancing, and relativizing monarchic, aristocratic, 
and democratic elements of form and structure"30 (Schmitt, op. cit. Bielefeldt, 1998: 27). 
Democracy, then, is a particular way of exercising political sovereignty, whereas liberal 
constitutionalism is a way of preventing it. Any democracy present in such a system is 
therefore at most half-hearted. In truth, the politics of a sovereign democracy and the 
29 Originally in Schmitt, CT (Verfassungslehre): 227. 
30 Originally in Schmitt, CT (Verfassungslehre): 228. 
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anti-politics of a constitutionalist state cannot co-exist for any period of time- one will, 
in the end, prevail. For Schmitt, what prevails can only be the political. 
Schmitt should not, therefore, be thought of as a democrat simply because he recognizes 
'democratic' sovereignty. He ensures the restraint of democracy as a mode of governing 
by tying the doctrine of constituent power of the people to the principle of sovereign 
representation. The sovereignty of the people is to be delegated to the established 
representatives who are not to act as popular agents, as the voice of the constituents 
(Schmitt despises the parliamentary model). The representation of the people in Schmitt 
always relates to the political unity of the people (i.e., the state). It is not a representation 
of society, and it is not a representation of single interests within society. The subject of 
representation is not the people in the state, but the "politically united and organized 
people which is the state itself' (BockenfOrde, 1998: 49). "Representation brings about 
unity, yet what it brings about is always the unity of a people in its political state" 
(Schmitt, COP: 214). Representation is therefore done by the rulers (those who hold 
sovereign power), not by the administration (those who act upon the sovereign decision). 
It is reserved for those who "epitomize and concretize the spiritual principle of political 
existence" (BockenfOrde, 1998: 49). 31 It is political unity (concrete, existing, and 
working) that makes possible individual rights and liberties for Schmitt. Political unity as 
sovereign power protects individuals from endangerment and violation. As with Hobbes, 
31 Notice the similarity here between Schmitt's 'representation' and Hobbes' conception 
ofthe 'monarchy'. See page seven. 
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Schmitt fuses sovereignty with representation, and by distinguishing the 'positive 
doctrine' of sovereignty from constituent power, through a non-popular representative 
sovereign, he denies the power of sovereignty to the people as a multitude while 
establishing the collectivity as its foundation. 
1.3 Hobbesian Sovereignty as Absolutist Democracy 
Schmitt adopts Hobbes' view of the relation between subject and sovereign as one of 
absolute submission to an omnipotent power. As I will discuss, the political is the realm 
in which 'friends' and 'enemies' are distinguished, and in the state it is the role of the 
sovereign to decide who fits where. He holds that the 'sovereign decision' is the highest 
political moment (Schmitt, COP: 43), and his critique of liberalism hinges on the liberal 
inability to incorporate 'the political' by insisting on individual equality and a 
universalizable humanity. This section will examine Schmitt's conception of equality as 
it relates to his critique of liberalism. Schmitt is able to show why Hobbes' conception of 
sovereignty, while based on liberal individualism, is best interpreted as democratic and 
not liberal. As we shall see, Hobbes' sovereignty must be understood as both an instance 
of the Schmittian political, and moreover as one of absolutist democracy. 
1.3.1 Homogeneity and 'Democratic' Equality 
Schmitt argues that "homogeneity" is the necessary condition of democracy (or at least 
the necessary condition of its possibility) (Schmitt, CPD: 9). In the preface to the second 
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edition of The Crisis of Political Democracy, Schmitt asserts that, 
Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but 
unequals will not be treated equally. Democracy requires, therefore, first 
homogeneity and second - if the need arises - elimination or eradication of 
heterogeneity. 32 
While chilling, given Schmitt's involvement in the legitimation of Third Reich policy, 
this thesis may force us, as Chantal Mouffe suggests, to come to terms with an aspect of 
democracy that liberalism tends to try to eliminate (Mouffe, 2000: 38).33 Homogeneity, 
for Schmitt, is inherent to the democratic conception of equality; there must be a 
"common substance" for the presence of homogeneity (Schmitt, CPD: 9). But he rejects 
the notion that the general equality of humanity has the capacity to serve as the 
foundation of any form of homogeneity, and thus of any state or form of government. 
Humanity, Schmitt asserts, cannot wage war; it has no enemy (no planetary enemy), and 
thus excludes the possibility for differentiation between 'friend' and 'enemy'. Indeed, it 
excludes the concept of the enemy altogether because "the enemy does not cease to be a 
32 Schmitt, CPD: 9 (trans., Ellen Kennedy). 
33 Mouffe is content to engage in Schmitt's critique ofliberalism, but maintains that 
democracy and liberalism, existing in tension with one another, are not mutually 
negating. She argues that while Schmitt is right to stress the 'deficiencies' of liberalism 
in constituting a pluralistic society in political terms, this commits us neither to giving up 
the possibility of a politically pluralistic liberal theory, nor to finding a solution to the 
exclusive nature of democracy. Schmitt, she holds, must be engaged with in order to 
theorize a fully formed constitutional democracy, but this does not lead us to believe his 
"false dilemma": the unity of the people (requiring expulsion of some members) or 
legitimate divisions of the people (leading to the negation ofpolitical unity and of the 
people as such). See Chantal Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Democracy", in 
The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), pg. 36-59. 
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human being", eliminating any internal differentiation on this basis (Schmitt, COP: 54).34 
The idea of 'humanity', based on the idea of some common denominator (or equality) 
among human beings, understood as the result of liberal individualism and universalism, 
is an anti-political equality, for Schmitt, because it does not have as a correlate the 
possibility of inequality. Politics must draw the line between friend and enemy. In 
liberalism, the inside of 'humanity' does not have an outside; everyone is included. 
Indeed, in liberalism, strict universalism generally tries to prevent an outside at all. But 
democracy must draw boundaries; in order to determine a majority mathematically, one 
must have a numerically determinate population. A democracy must, therefore, have an 
inside and an outside; that is, a border at which it stops.35 Liberalism and democracy are, 
therefore, mutually incompatible. The political is the realm in which 'friends' are 
distinguished from 'enemies', and liberalism has no such realm. The 'enemies' of 
liberalism, to the extent that there are any, are never concrete and thus never eliminable. 
For Schmitt, therefore, when we speak of equality, we must speak of two distinct 
conceptions of the word: liberal equality and democratic equality. The former, he holds, 
34 When war is waged in the name of 'humanity', Schmitt holds, it has an "especially 
intensive political meaning" - when an enemy is fought in the name of humanity the war 
is not for the sake of humanity, but for the sake of one state's (coalition's) usurpation of a 
universal concept against its opponent. It tries, he says, to ally itself with humanity in the 
same way that we misuse peace, justice, progress, and 'civilization' to deny these to the 
enemy- that is, to dehumanize the enemy. Indeed, the concept of humanity itself is, for 
Schmitt, an ideological tool of imperialism; in its "ethical-humanitarian" form, a mode of 
economic imperialism. See Carl Schmitt, Concept of the Political, (1932) (George 
Schwab, trans.) (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976), pg. 54. 
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maintains that every person is, as a person, automatically equal ('in worth and dignity', 
etc.) to every other person. Contrarily, the latter requires the possibility of distinguishing 
between who belongs to the demos (people) and who is exterior to it - to equality there 
must be a correlate possibility of inequality. 
1.3.2 Political Community, Political Unity 
This 'democracy' then, is squarely an instance of the Schmittian political, as that which 
entails the possibility of distinction: inside from outside, friend from enemy, included 
from excluded, and so forth. This 'democracy' is not a form of government, but a 
conception of constituent power. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it requires a 
bordered demos in order to serve its function, to have a general will. Political democracy 
for Schmitt, cannot, therefore, be based on a generality of all humanity. It must belong to 
a specific people,36 understood as one of a multiplicity of ways for homogeneity 
(peoplehood), constituting a demos (state), to be manifested: " ... since the nineteenth 
century [equality] has existed above all in membership in a particular nation, in national 
homogeneity" (Schmitt, CPD: 9). The nature of the similarity on which homogeneity is 
based is not important; what matters is the possibility of drawing a line between those 
35 Clearly, liberal politics has boundaries. Animals and machines are not generally 
included as existing in any political context. Furthermore, liberal thought tends to leave 
room for the non-personhood of fetuses, comatose patients, and so forth, even when these 
are held, by many, to be issues involving persons. 
36 Mouffe notes that while it is the case that a specific people is required, for Schmitt, to 
have a democracy, this phrase should not be understood as applying to a 'racial' group. 
Chantal Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Democracy", in The Democratic 
Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), pg. 40. 
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who belong to the demos (who, therefore, have equal rights), and those who do not have 
the same rights because they do not belong to the demos. As Mouffe argues, it is this 
type of democratic equality which is known today through citizenship, and it is through 
belonging to a demos that citizens are granted equal rights.37 Their inclusion in an 
abstract notion of humanity does not perform this function. 38 Democracy, as such, can 
exist only for a 'people' and not for humanity (Schmitt, CPD: 11). Democracy relies on 
the 'political' nature of a 'people', which distinguishes, on the basis of some factor(s) of 
homogeneity, between its members and those who 'do not count'. Humanity, as a 
concept, does not admit of politically defined 'us' and 'them' (excepting animals, 
machines, and non-persons) in ways that, for Schmitt, are of any consequence. 'The 
political' exists in the space of concrete, personified 'friend' and 'enemy', not in the 
abstract, conceptual 'good' and 'evil' of liberal doctrine (Schmitt, COP: 28). To 
illustrate this, Schmitt shows that even in modern democratic states, where universal 
human equality is established as a value and norm, there exists a category of people who 
are excluded as foreigners. He also holds that the correlate of any equality present among 
the citizenry of those states is a strong emphasis on national homogeneity and on the lines 
of demarcation between citizens and foreigners (Schmitt, CPD: 11). This is to be 
37 Free emergency medical care, for example, is not provided to foreign visitors by the 
governments of nations where such a policy is in place for state nationals. In many 
instances of citizenship around the world, 'rights' refer universally but are only 
practically realized by those with access via wealth and the capacity to buy. 
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expected, Schmitt tells us. If it were not the case, if states tried to realize a universal 
equality of individuals without concern for national (or any other form of) homogeneity, 
then political equality, brought by being a 'friend', would be completely devalued and 
political unity would crumble. This, he holds, is precisely what liberal democracy tries to 
do; simultaneous commitment to a segregated (democratic) political state (community) 
and to the (at least conceptually) universal equality of worth and dignity of all human 
beings is practically impossible- only one of these can 'win out'. 
Much like Hobbes, then, political unity is crucial for Schmitt; but for Schmitt it is 
'democracy', that is, formation upon a political people, which provides the basis for state 
existence. A state must be distinguished from other /the outside and for Schmitt, its 
foundation on a 'people', possessing of 'substantive homogeneity' ('democracy') is what 
grants the state its instantiation as a political unit. Recall that the political is the realm in 
which 'friends' and 'enemies' are distinguished, and that the sovereign decision is the 
foremost instance of the political. 'Democracy' consists in the identity between ruler and 
ruled (citizenship), as linked to the principle of the unity of the demos and its sovereignty 
(Mouffe, 2000: 43). Therefore, if the will of the people is to take shape as a unity, there 
must exist criteria to determine who are the bearers of democratic rights. 
38 Many theorists hold that there are grounds for instituting a system of cosmopolitan 
citizenship (or a 'thick' conception of rights) based on a commitment to the equality of 
all human beings. See, for example, David Held's Democracy and the Global Order 
(Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995); and Richard Falk's On Human Governance 
(Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995). 
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1.3.3 Sovereignty and Political Embodiment 
In Hobbes, political unity is embodied in the sovereign, whose power, as fundamental act 
of will, lays the groundwork for state order. Political 'democracy' is conceivable in 
Hobbes in a slightly different way than in Schmitt: the sovereign ('civil person'), as the 
representation of the public will and power of the people, embodies the democracy (the 
appointment of the people) in his person. Sovereign power, understood as the collective 
power of the subjects residing in a man or counsel, is democratic power, understood as 
the representative collective will of a defined 'people'. If we understand 'protection' as a 
way of expressing what Schmitt would call 'right', this comparison becomes closer still: 
Hobbes' sovereign provides protection through ownership, while Schmitt's democracy 
provides rights through citizenship (determined by sovereign decision). The sovereign 
decision in both is the means for establishing the criterion for inclusion. In Hobbes, the 
sovereign is the foundation and content of the law which exists outside of the law (as its 
sole director). In the Hobbesian state, it is the law which decides who is subject to the 
law and who is exempt from it. Similarly, it is the sovereign (law) who decides who is 
protected by the sovereign (law) and who is abandonable to the world outside of its 
protection. But on what basis can I claim that Hobbes' theory of sovereignty is best 
understood as an example of Schmittian democracy? 
First, it is important to separate the homogeneity of a people through common substance 
as a necessary condition of democracy from democracy itself. Hobbes' theory of 
sovereignty yields a common substance on two levels. Individual subjects engaged in the 
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social contract initially experience a common, mutual fear for their lives at the hands of 
one another and, in agreeing to be ruled by an all-powerful sovereign, experience a 
common tie to one another in agreeing to live peacefully together and be ruled by a 
common sovereign. Individual subjects also experience a 'common substance' if by 
substance we understand something like 'the nature of life under a designated sovereign's 
rule'. 
The sovereign, as empowered by the collectively transferred wills of the people (the 
subjects), simultaneously represents and transcends this will. If we are to understand 
democracy as that political instance in which the people have sovereign power to decide 
who will and who will not be included in the demos (as Schmitt would have us do), then 
Hobbes' sovereign ('civil person', 'city') is a man or counsel that embodies such a 
power. This is, in fact, his nature by definition. Recall that not only does the Hobbesian 
sovereign embody the will of the people (and the multiplicity of individual subjects as 
'the city') -- as the law, he is the criterion for inclusion or exclusion within it. That is, the 
constitution of the Hobbesian sovereign is conceivable as the embodiment of the political 
nature of democracy. Recall as well that the mind of Hobbes' leviathan was the 
'reasoning' state infrastructure, while the sovereign was the soul, the spirit and life-force 
of the state. Schmitt's distinction between the state as the location and the people as the 
force of the political is much the same. As composed of the strength and will of a people, 
the soul is likely to reflect the spirit and life-force of this people. Such a common spirit 
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and 'personality' of peoplehood clearly rails against a notion of equal humanity- some 
people fit into and reflect such a spirit or personality and others simply do not. 
There is individual equality in Hobbes, certainly, but it is of the kind described by 
Schmitt as 'democratic equality', that is, it exists only between members of the (each) 
social contract- the subjects. But as Schmitt notes, and Hobbes would agree, a citizen 
(as a subject) is only a citizen if s/he belongs to a people. Equality in these terms is thus 
inextricably tied to membership in a people, to engagement in the social contract. In 
Hobbes' case, the people is defined by a common sovereign power to which all subjects 
submit without exception. For this submission, subjects retain the protection of the 
sovereign's power, both from one another and from themselves. We may understand this 
as a 'right' (for Hobbes, a 'power' to exercise what one wills), but we need not do so. 
Schmitt's democracy does not require rights, except for citizens to say, as with Hobbes' 
subjects, that 'I belong to sovereign X and to no other'. 
Hobbes' initial moment of civil war, on the other hand, in which each man's life is in the 
hands of every other, in which mutual fear is present, characterizes a liberal notion of 
'humanity' and 'human equality'. Persons are equal under the law of nature in that, 
without the social contract, their lives are equally nasty, equally brutish, and (relatively) 
equally short; their lives are instances of what Giorgio Agamben calls 'bare life' 
(Agamben, 1998), life divorced from legal engagements. They are equal under the law of 
nature in that, without the social contract, they are always afraid. They are equal under 
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the law of nature in their inability to live for long periods in peace without a fear of 
punishment for failing to do so. But once engaged in the social contract, as all humans 
are, equality moves to the interior of the realm of sovereign power. Humans under a 
sovereign are no longer humans as 'bare life', but are subjects as politicized beings. 
Life is absorbed into the political realm by the sovereign through the sovereign's decision 
to include or exclude. This moment of decision is one of transition. Because the nature 
of sovereignty includes the justice of punishment (in Hobbes the sovereign decides what 
is just, and is thus incapable of acting unjustly; in Schmitt the law is the act of the 
democratic sovereign who decides who will live and who will die), we must acknowledge 
the role of violence in sovereign power. Political rule, the law, and justice are only 
understandable through the legitimacy of the attack on the citizen, in each case by their 
own will. 39 If the state and/or sovereign power are understood to be legitimated by and 
the representative of the people, then any attack upon them (decision about them) must be 
similarly conceived. It is only the absorption of life into the sovereign realm (as in the 
sovereign-subject relation) that can authorize politics, understood as the realm 
distinguishing friend and enemy. The sovereign decision to take life, and the subject's 
acceptance of the right of another to take life, is the ultimate political moment. It is thus 
life (in the multiplicity of individual lives) that makes the differentiation between citizens 
and foreigners, inside and outside, possible. 
39 For more on the citizen attack by his/her own will, see Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 103-113; hereafter 
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Democracy: Foundational, Governing, and Electoral 
Before I continue on, I want to clarify some points on the concept of democracy, or 
rather, the concepts of democracy I have been using, or which I will use shortly. As I 
write and think more seriously about the subject, and about Schmitt's version with regard 
to his critique of liberalism, the issues seem to become much more cloudy and complex 
than the word 'democracy' might first let on. This is largely the result of the relationship 
of democracy to sovereign power, as we will see. For ease of classification, I will 
identify three modes of democracy, although these clearly do not exhaust all of the 
options or do justice to their identifiable sub-versions. 
The first was used in the first chapter with reference to Hobbes as interpreted through 
Schmitt- democracy as sovereign legitimacy or, perhaps, social contract democracy, in 
which 'democracy' refers to a political system in which we are to understand the 
sovereign power to be the result of an originary consensus or agreement to contract itself 
to said sovereign. The sovereign power is that which is legitimated by the demos and 
which, as such, is understood to take on and embody all of their collective wills and 
powers in one entity. Sovereign legitimation comes in the understood agreement of a 
given group of people engaged in the social contract, entered into under duress oftheir 
own nature. The sovereign-democratic relationship is one of protection in exchange for 
unconditional obedience- in an odd tum, the power invested in the sovereign by the 
cited in the text as (Hardt & Negri, 2000: page). 
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joined will of the people is precisely the power to which it must bow down. The 
sovereign is understood to protect the individuals from one another and from outside 
threat to the community and its interests. This conception coincides with the classical 
modem conception of sovereignty (Hobbes, Bodin, etc.). 
The second is the mode of democracy we are most familiar with in the West-
democracy as a mode of governance, or national capital democracy. This mode of 
democracy is understood to legitimate the sovereignty of the people qua the political 
body, and is characteristic of the liberal democratic state. I associate this type of 
democracy with the ideal of individual sovereign autonomy, gathered to form a collective 
sovereignty that is greater than the sum of its parts. This is most often the case in 
systems which are embedded in the capitalist market economic structure, such that the 
sovereignty of each individual is required for the conceptual equality of each, 
predominantly as a consumer and/or holder of property. This conception coincides with 
the rise and solidification of liberal constitutionalism in the West, emphasizing equality 
between individuals and governance that is truly the result (ideally) of the people's 
choice. 
Finally, I identify a rather new conception of democracy, one that stems predominantly 
from the latter mode, but embodies certain characteristics of the former. Cursory 
democracy as a mode of legitimacy, or electoral democracy, is the type of democracy we 
see occurring increasingly in the present world order, often in states which have not been 
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engaged in liberal constitutional frameworks of government previously. This is the mode 
of democracy in which free elections (often not 'free and fair') are held, usually to 
determine sovereign rule as opposed to determining representative governance. Often 
what results are what Fareed Zakaria calls 'illiberal democracies', to contrast them with 
the liberal democracies of the constitutionalist West. Electoral democracies are, it seems, 
the result of a desire both to open markets around the world and to have peace between 
nations, and are largely established at the encouragement (or rather, pressure) of the 
internationalized Western world. This mode of democracy coincides with the dual nature 
of the present capitalist world order, and represents the other pole of the liberal 
democracy. 
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Chapter II 
The Nation, The People, and Absolutist Democracy 
The people rules in all governments. For even in monarchies the people commands; for 
the people wills by the will of one man ... (however it seem a paradox) the king is the 
people. 
Thomas Hobbes, De Cive 
The precarious power of sovereignty as a solution to the crisis of modernity was first 
referred for support to the nation, and then when the nation too was revealed as a 
precarious solution, it was further referred to the people. 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire 
Political democracy cannot rest upon the indistinctions of all human beings; instead, it is 
based upon membership in a particular people. 
Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre 
Modem theories of state sovereignty can be characterized by their preoccupation with 
state legitimacy. The Hobbesian conception of sovereignty is one of absolutism 
legitimated by the social contract. His emphasis, however, on the sovereign as the 
embodiment and the unity of individual subjects tends to reflect a concept of transcendent 
sovereign essence (not just power) and distinct sovereign personality. In addition, that 
this conception clearly means to delineate between state authorities instead of 
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establishing a means by which to overcome them, tends to dissociate such a view from 
liberal conceptions of universality and common humanity.40 
In the last chapter, I established Hobbes' conception of sovereign power as one that could 
be called a 'Schmittian' democracy, that is, an absolutist democracy. The 'people' is 
understood as the force of state legitimacy for Hobbes; indeed, his focus was the rational 
foundation of legitimate sovereign power. But the 'people' is understood as itself 
sovereign only insofar as it is embodied or represented by a sovereign man or counsel, 
possessing every right over his (their) subjects (and even declaring what those rights 
entail). The 'people', it seems, must be understood in some way to have (indirect) 
sovereignty over itself in order for the state to be legitimated. In this chapter I will 
attempt to link the concepts of (Hobbesian) foundational democracy of states to that of 
nationalism, both liberal and illiberal. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the location of sovereign power changed from the ruler to the ruled (the 
'people') directly, and this occurred largely in conjunction with a certain 
conceptualization of the 'nation' as political form. The sovereign power theorized by 
Hobbes finds its place more concretely in the 'people', as the legitimators of state power. 
A 'people' is understood to legitimate a state insofar as it is understood to have a 
4
°Clearly, there are many who would describe themselves as both liberal and nationalist 
(or preferentially patriotic). Some theorists argue that 'liberal nationalism' is compatible 
with a cosmopolitan ethic (that is, the view that all people are equal in worth and dignity -
- and right -- regardless of nationality or citizenship). See Jocelyne Couture, 
"Cosmopolitan Democracy and Liberal Nationalism", in The Monist, 82(3), 1999: 491-
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collective 'will'. The state becomes sovereign only insofar as it is understood to 
represent the sovereignty of the 'people' and to embody its 'national identity'. In the 
final section, I will contend that 'democracy' becomes a confusing mix between a mode 
of state representation and a means of national legitimation. Moreover, it is now the 
democratic 'nation' which justifies the exclusion of some of state members such that the 
unity 'the people' is preserved. 
2.1 Hobbes' Sovereign Legitimacy 
Hobbes' theories of state sovereignty and sovereign power, though not the only such 
theories of the modem period, are certainly the most recognized. F .H. Hinsey argues that 
Hobbes completed the modem notion of (state) sovereignty, thereby solidifying the 
conception of state legitimacy, by substituting the "equal rightlessness of men as 
individuals before the state that was their own creation" for the previous dualism between 
monarch and people.
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He contends that Hobbes accomplishes this by setting out from 
Jean Bodin's theory of sovereignty in which the subjects retain their rights and powers 
against the sovereign -- sovereign power is absolute, perpetual and complete, but it does 
not override the rights of individual citizens (Bodin, 1992). For Hobbes, the sovereign 
relation exists between sovereign and subject, but these are not fully distinct entities; the 
515. For an argument in favour of a liberal nationalist approach see work by Yael Tamir, 
Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and Michael Walzer. 
41 F. H. Hinsey, Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 98; 
hereafter cited in the text as (Hinsey, 1986: page). 
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authority of the ruler, in Hobbes, is the authority, will, and action of every subject.42 
John Hoffman argues, on the other hand, that the problem of consistency present in the 
earlier modem works on sovereignty remains in Hobbes;
43 
the claim that sovereignty is 
absolute, perpetual, and total cannot be reconciled with the claim of (limited) subject 
rights.
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Allowing subject rights when the sovereign is conceived as all powerful over 
his subjects (i.e., they have no rights against the sovereign) reveals the fundamental 
contradiction of state power. Hoffman holds that Hobbes' concern with the legitimacy of 
the state through the social contract causes him to make such a limitation on the power of 
the sovereign (through the 'silence of the law', subject liberty) that the desire for subject 
rights overrides the claim to absolute power, thus threatening his own conception of 
sovereignty (Hoffman, 1998: 40). 
But if Hobbes retains the crisis of modernity, the legitimacy of state rule, in his theory, he 
also provides the conceptual framework to relieve it of this tension. It is precisely this 
tension that is mitigated by the national formation. And while Hobbes does not resolve 
the tension himself, his theory provides conceptual tools which coincide with what would 
later be used in the formation of nations. His emphasis on a unification under the 
sovereign called the 'people' (Hobbes, De Cive: 2, XII, 8), on the absolutist nature of 
42 See above. 
43 John Hoffman, Sovereignty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 40; 
hereafter cited in the text as (Hoffman, 1998: page). 
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sovereign power, and on the unquestionable need for state legitimacy, all provide a way 
out of the crisis ofthe legitimate state: these are all important components in the more 
contemporary concept of 'nationhood'. Indeed, although he never conceptualized the 
'nation', his theorization of sovereign power as embodiment and representation of the 
'people' leads directly to its formulation. But we must not be fooled into thinking that 
the 'people' pre-exist the nation or the state. On the contrary, the 'nation' is only ever a 
product of the state for its own legitimation, and a 'people' is only ever a means to 
justifying the 'nation'. The fundamental problem of the post-Hobbesian state is to 
produce the 'people' and to make it continually reproducing in order to identify and 
support a national community, and this problem amounts to the production of some 
unitary effect, a homogeneous effect, through which the 'people' will seem to be 'a 
people', the basis of legitimate political power. 
We also see this idea of unitary effect appearing in Schmitt. Recall that, for him, what 
characterizes democracy is a mode of political rule in which sovereign power is primarily 
involved in deciding the nature of homogeneity and performing the task of concrete 
homogenization (the foundation of 'the people'). The 'nation', appearing about two 
hundred years ago,
45 
is, I hold, an example of such a 'democracy'- it acts as that which 
44 Hoffman refers to Jean Bodin's work, On Sovereignty: Four chapters from the six 
books ofthe commonwealth, (Julian H. Franklin, ed. and trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
45 I am thinking here of post-Revolutionary France, in particular (i.e., after 1799). For 
more on the formation of the nation concept, see Leonard Tivey, ed., The Nation-state: 
the formation of modern politics (Oxford: M. Robertson, 1981 ). 
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founds a people, and it does so through the homogenization of a multitude. Schmitt's 
'democracy' requires a defined people understood to share a common substance, that is, 
to embody a homogeneity. The 'nation', as I will explain, must be understood to be 
based upon a given 'people' in order to hold any political weight. The nation must 
delineate between 'friends' (members ofthe people) and 'enemies'. Schmitt, unlike 
theorists in favour of the conceptualization of the naturalized 'people' (Michael Walzer, 
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for example ) is not fooled into thinking that the nation is that political manifestation of 
the people; on the contrary, he identifies straight away the role and power the state has in 
creating the people. 
Schmitt holds that democracy, as the foundation of a state, is exclusive. But why ought 
we understand the nation in this way? There are various forms of liberal nationalism, and 
certainly various forms ofliberal democracy. Our present conception of the state and its 
sovereignty is based, I contend, on the Hobbesian model. Remember that Hobbesian 
sovereignty, like that of Schmitt, is a monopoly of decision (entailing any means to 
enforce given rulings). This monopoly must be engagable in states of 
46 I should be clear: Walzer does not dispute that 'peoples' and 'nations' are 
constructions; indeed he writes that "[c]onstructed communities are the only communities 
there are". My point here is that some theorists identify that communities are constructed 
and then hold them to be or treat them as somehow natural or naturally based, as Walzer 
does by continually privileging the "shared experiences", "cooperative activity", and 
"common life" of the nation which, in his estimation, is that body that gives a people 
(tribe) the rights to political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Schmitt, on the other 
hand, has no illusions about the naturalness of such a formation. See Michael Walzer, 
"The New Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult Problem", in Theorizing Nationalism (Ronald 
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exception/emergency, but may be understood to be 'silent' when order is established and 
citizen interaction is relatively stable. In present (legitimate) states, power is held by a 
person or group who is understood to represent the 'people' as that unitary body of 
citizens. I hold that if the above claims are true, the sovereign establishes and represents a 
unity, both internally and externally, by defining the terms of the nation, by deciding who 
counts and who does not count as a member of the nation, as a citizen. 
2.2 The Sovereign State: The People and the Multitude 
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Contrary to the present-day Western penchant for representing the political realm in 
terms of citizen rights, free will, social contracts, and so forth, from the departure point of 
modem (i.e., Hobbesian) sovereignty, it is subjected life that is "authentically political" 
(Agamben, 1998: 106; original italics). That is, our present representation of political life 
(citizenship) is the result of a conceptual tradition of subjects under a sovereign power 
(the sovereign-subject relation). Life that has been absorbed into the political realm by 
the sovereign decision to include/exclude is life that has entered the realm of 'friend' and 
'enemy'. This explains why, for Hobbes, the basis of sovereignty is sought not in the 
subjects' free renunciation of their natural right, but rather in the sovereign's preservation 
of his (in addition to theirs, combined), to do anything to any subject, i.e., the right to 
punish as he sees fit (and what is fit is something over which he is the only judge). 
Beiner, ed.) (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), and Just and Unjust Wars, Third Ed. (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977). 
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Recall that, for Schmitt, as for Hobbes, the monopoly of sovereignty is the monopoly of 
decision. If this is the case, we are better able to conceive why understanding Hobbes' 
myth, the state of nature, renders us, in thinking of and within a modem democratic 
framework, incapable of imagining politics without imagining the form of the state, of 
the sovereign. Still, it remains 'the people' who retain the sovereignty of their respective 
states; and it is through 'the people' represented by the 'nation' that sovereignty retains 
its function, its power, and its ability to be a part of the international theatre. 
It seems important here to differentiate between 'the people' as a collective and 'the 
multitude' as a group of individuals, and it is in Hobbes that we find one of the first 
accounts of such a difference. Not distinguishing between the people and the multitude, 
Hobbes writes, is a "hindrance to civil government" (Hobbes, De Cive: 2, XII, 8). The 
people is one, "having one will", a unity, "to whom one action may be attributed"; "none 
of these can be properly said of the multitude" (Hobbes, De Cive: 2, XII, 8). The 
multitude is the group of individual subjects who each owe their submission to the 
sovereign. It is a "multiplicity, a plane of singularities, an open set of relations", bearing 
"an indistinct, inclusive relation to those outside of it" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 1 03). 
Schmitt noticed that it was the people who needed to be understood as embodying 
sovereign power (see Chapter One), as did Hobbes (see epigraph). The 'people' is based 
on a conception of internal homogeneity and identity, as well as the differentiation from 
what is external. This is the case for Schmitt and for Hobbes, but it is also the case in the 
47 When I use the words 'Western', 'the West', and so forth, I am referring to the non-
Islamic Western World-- predominantly North America, Western Europe (and perhaps 
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present Western conception of a 'people', which is often tied conceptually to an idea of 
civic, cultural, ethnic, or racial continuity.
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As such, nations must create a people out of 
the multitude because only a 'people' is capable of sovereignty. It provides a unified will 
and force of action that overrides (and often conflicts with) the singular interests of the 
multitude. But the nation must be understood in a particular way in order to give the state 
the type of projected unity it needs to maintain its justifiability as sovereign at all. The 
sovereign, as justified by its ties to the nation, is the master of the nation, of the unity of 
its projects. The sovereign decision thus comes to refer to the establishing of the lines of 
nationhood, of inside or outside, of protection and obedience. 
2.3 The Political Realm of the Nation 
2.3.1 Invention and Imagination 
There is a conceptual difference between the nation and the people which, as Bernard 
Yack holds, 'strains' ordinary language (Yack, 2001: 520). Both are, to use Benedict 
Anderson's famous phrase, 'imagined communities', both derive their character from the 
way in which distant individuals imagine their connections to one another that do not 
involve their direct or even indirect interactions. While the 'nation' allows us to imagine 
a community that precedes us and survives us, the 'people' allows us to imagine a 
Japan). 
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community which we share with others in dealing with the state's coercive authority 
(Yack, 2001: 521). The 'people' is always available to be invoked in the struggle with 
political authority or for political power; "It exists as long as one believes in a particular 
theory ofpoliticallegitimacy" (Yack, 2001: 521). The denial ofthe 'people' becomes a 
matter of injustice as opposed to misdescription. 
Relatively speaking, the 'people' is still a new or modem conception, 'invented' to solve 
the problems of political legitimacy within the modem state. It draws on images of the 
multitude and of the ruling group of a community. 'The people' is the constituent 
sovereign power that establishes government. This is clearly a highly abstract concept. 
Hegel complained about conceiving of 'the people' for precisely this reason; what was so 
dangerous and mysterious for him in the idea of 'the people' as a constituent sovereign 
power was a lack of institutional definition, making it susceptible to irrational appeals to 
public passions. "The word most on its lips is the 'people'; but the special mark which it 
carries on its brow is the hatred of law" (Hegel, 1967: 6). Law is "the shibboleth which 
marks out these false friends and comrades of what they call the 'people'" (Hegel, 1967: 
7). But it is precisely the abstractness and mysteriousness of the 'people' as constituent 
of sovereignty that is indispensable in liberal democratic politics; it allows all territorial 
48 Recall that for Schmitt, "democracy is a particular form of political sovereignty. 
Ultimately, in a genuine democracy what is important is that there is sovereign authority 
of a collective unity of the people, facilitated by and resting on a 'substantive 
homogeneity' (the people)." See Chapter One. Homogeneity must be "a medium through 
which a people can distinguish itself from other peoples and thus find its specific 
identity" (Bielefeldt, 1998: 27). 
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inhabitants to be spoken of as a collectivity, as a collective source of state authority, but 
as a collective of individuals. 
2.3.2 Political Self-Assertion 
The question remains as to why the nation has been so closely associated, in the last two 
centuries, with political self-assertion. Generally, popular sovereigntists hold that 
monarchic and aristocratic rule usurp the right of the people by claiming sovereign power 
over given persons or territory (Yack, 2001: 522). These thinkers do not insist, however, 
that the people have the right to use the state's authority without limit. Rather, they argue 
that all forms of government take their authority from the inhabitants of a territory, 
imagined as a unified collectivity. The 'people', therefore, represents a new form of 
political community. The one imagined by popular sovereigntists represents neither an 
(absolutist) community of subjects, nor a (republican) community of participant rulers. 
Rather, it is the community from which political authority (government) arises and to 
which it reverts when it no longer serves its proper function (Yack, 2001: 522). This 
conception seems to point to a sovereign power that is indirect, or mediated, through the 
function of government, the state. That is, sovereign power, which is the people's, is 
administered by the state, but remains conceptually understood as the people's. In many 
ways, this comes directly from Hobbes, although clearly, in Hobbes, the political 
authority of the sovereign never 'reverts' back to the people, save in a case of civil war. 
Schmitt maintained that constitutional sovereignty was the people's insofar as they were 
a homogeneous unity, even though state rule held the monopoly of power and decision. 
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Under this conception, then, of indirect or mediated sovereignty, something that is not 
contained in the structure of institutions or exercise of rule and being ruled (government), 
must define the people. In Schmittian terms, the rule of law (i.e., liberal 
constitutionalism) cannot and does not define the people, and as such is incapable of 
leading a political unity. If the people are understood to precede political authority and 
survive its dissolution, the case both for Schmitt and for many populist thinkers, then 
something beyond a relation to that authority must be shared. 
The 'people' is clearly understood as a bounded community. Practically speaking, there 
is the boundary of subjection to a given common authority, which not every member of 
the human family shares. Conceptually speaking, the 'people' is based on, if not 
homogeneity, then certainly 'something shared' between them which is different from 
what is shared between members of the community and what is outside of it. We must 
ask, then, from where these boundaries originate. In general, those who theorize nations 
and, particularly, nationalisms, hold that these boundaries come either from the state, as 
that body of (at least administrative) power which is distinct from the 'nation't9 or from 
the rights of the 'nation', the representative of a 'people'. 
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In the first scenario, if 
'peoples' are the communities to which states are understood to be accountable, then the 
49 For example, see Etienne Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology" (Chris 
Turner, trans.), in E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous 
Identities (London: Verso, 1991), p. 86-106. 
5
° For an example of this general kind, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 53-58. 
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boundaries between one people and another will be those that differentiate the reach of 
one state's coercive authority from another's. In the second, if the 'people' is understood 
to exist a priori to the state, as the community that authorizes the state's authority and 
survives its dissolution, then it cannot be defined by the boundaries of individual states. 
The people is imagined as both a priori and as defined by the state, as both pre- and post-
political community (Yack, 2001: 523). 
2.4 The Nation in Perspective: A Historical Account 
Given that the community which is understood both to authorize and to survive the state 
cannot be defined by state boundaries and rule, it may be helpful to look at some of the 
historical conceptions which lead us to 'the people' and the nation today. This 
development was highly complex and subject to a seemingly infinite number of variables, 
depending upon region, pre-state populations, and so forth. What follows is not only 
brief, but represents only one possible account of the logic of national formation. I have 
included it to give some historical depth and context to the concept of the nation. 
In the Hanover school of the late German Enlightenment, modern theories of sovereignty 
were used to analyze the real historical continuity of the territory, population, and nation, 
conceiving of these as social and cultural continuities (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 100). 
National identity was conceived as the product of a 'primordial unity' -the 'nation' is a 
complete instance of sovereignty before any historical development; "the nation sustains 
the concept of sovereignty by claiming to precede it ... The nation becomes finally the 
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condition of possibility of all human action and social life itself' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 
101). By the early nineteenth century, the concept of national sovereignty emerged in 
European thought in 'completed form'. The French Revolution certainly assisted in this 
completion, and its resolution in the appropriation and veneration of the (concept of the) 
'nation'. 
Given the social and political climate, it was at this time that Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes, a 
French thinker, linked the concept of the nation to the bourgeoisie, interpreting the nation 
as a constructive political concept, a 'constitutional mechanism' ,51 which allowed the 
bourgeoisie leverage over the aristocracy, running counter to the dictatorial powers 
established through war. Responsibility for the war of 1792, placed squarely in the hands 
of the French by Georges Michon, represents a decisive moment of Schmittian politics 
and a demonstration of its sovereign power: 
War was willed solely to act as a diversion from the social problems which were 
becoming more serious with every day that passed. For six months, several 
methods had been employed in an attempt to destroy the democratic party and 
not one had succeeded; so this time the extreme remedy - war - was to be tried, 
for it would give the government dictatorial powers and would allow it to 
eliminate its detested enemies. For these groups the war was a grand manoeuvre 
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of domestic politics. 
51 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes (1748-1836), "What is the Third Estate?" ("Qu'est-ce que le 
tiers etat?") in William H. Sewell, A rhetoric of bourgeois revolution: the Abbe Sieyes 
and What is the Third Estate?" (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994). 
52 Georges Michon (Paris, 1924) (T.C.W. Blanning, trans.), op. cit. T.C.W. Blanning, The 
Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (London: Longman, 1986), pg.71. 
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Where the nation has been offered conceptually as something popular and revolutionary, 
as in the case of the French Revolution, it is easy to conclude that the nation had broken 
free from the modem conception of sovereignty (as a means of domination and ultimate 
power) and dedicated itself to a 'democratic' (that is, popularly founded) notion of 
'community'. But in the case of the Third Estate, and likely in most cases of national 
construction, this is not necessarily the case. Linking these two, the nation and the 
democratic (popular) community, as Sieyes did, was a "powerful innovation" (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: 102). Where nations exist (or are understood to exist) the state is 
understood as the structure that allows the community ('the people') to function 
politically, and the nation is the political community for which the state performs its role. 
The nation acts as the political abstraction of the community which popular sovereigntists 
theorize as holding sovereignty. The power of the nation-state is thus comprised of the 
sovereign nation (community representation) on the one hand, and on the other, the 
power of coercion and external representation on the part of the state. The sovereignty of 
the state in a 'nation-state' is therefore clearly understood to lie in the hands of the nation, 
although it is practically administered by state infrastructure. The nation 'completes' the 
notion of state sovereignty by claiming to precede it (therefore legitimating it), and the 
people completes the nation via another logical regression. The identity of the people 
must appear natural and originary in order to hold political power -- in the case of the 
French bourgeoisie, over the will of the people, whose force, if properly discharged, was 
conceived as unstoppable; but this is always already fallacious. 'The people' is posed as 
pre-existing the nation-state, but the modem notion of 'a people' is actually its product 
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(Balibar, 1997). The 'people' is a community that recognizes itself as arriving before the 
inception of the state. The state thus 'belongs' to the people, and the people's political 
issues are therefore inscribed within it. 
2.5 Democracy and Democratic Foundation: Connections 
Hobbes' emphasis on state sovereignty and the legitimation of that sovereignty through 
the social contract provides us with the means to date the conceptual framework of the 
nation to the mid-seventeenth century. That is to say, the nation, so named and 
established as an entity in its own right, did not appear until the tum of the nineteenth 
century, but its conceptual precursors were present from the time of Hobbes. I have 
shown that the concept of the created nation relies on 'the people' and is thus closely tied 
to the political self-assertion of peoples. Through Schmitt, the people are theorized as the 
basic foundation of the state and in Hobbes, "the king is the people" (see epigraph); that 
is to say, the sovereign power is the unitary location of the people. The nation may be 
said to be that contemporary conception which joins with and thus endows the state with 
the legitimacy of the people. The nation can be thought of as the antithesis of the 
multitude which is nonetheless derived from it. For contemporary politics, on this view, 
the nation is the political location of the pre-political people- it is the nation, the 
legitimate political force, which endows autonomous states with sovereignty. The nation 
reflects or is understood to reflect the character and personality of the people at an 
abstracted and more powerful level. 
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Increasingly, particularly in the Western liberal constitutional states, an ethic of 
multicultural constitutionalism and liberal 'tolerance' pervade, at least on the surface of 
political rhetoric.
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The nation has become increasingly based on citizenship as opposed 
to country of origin (e.g. jus sanguinis, see above, f.n. 52) and, at least in states like 
Canada, on a perceived and embodied 'nation' of immigrants and the ancestors of 
immigrants. The rhetoric of the nation has become tied to social spending (i.e., universal 
healthcare) and inclusive freedom (i.e., the 'tossed salad' as opposed to the 'melting 
pot'). Certainly, such national foundations offend any Schmittian sensibilities, insofar as 
they subjugate difference and shy-away from the political. And such offended 
sensibilities can be found lurking under the surface of the nationalist political discourse 
of the new Right, neo-conservatives, whose often hard line stance on such things as 
immigration policy and welfare spending appears to be cropping up across the liberal 
constitutional West. 
But I hold that while Schmitt would criticize the inclusiveness of the multiculturalism of 
constitutional liberal governments, their mode of founding their rule and legitimating 
their power is Hobbesian. The nature of electoral voting serves to distinguish between 
inside and outside, at least on the national level. One must be a member of a given 
political community to participate in voting; one must be a member in residence, a voice 
53 I should note that while states like Canada maintain (quite acceptable levels) of 
multicultural policies (Will Kymlicka, in a paper given at the University of Regina, 
October, 2003, based on findings of research done on global multiculturalism), any 
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of 'the people' in order to go to the polls. In many liberal constitutional states, this power 
is open to those meeting relatively minimal limits of qualification. In others, like 
Germany, one must still prove blood relation to a German citizen to be allowed to vote.54 
It may be said that the whole point of democratic process through voting in liberal 
constitutional states is to represent the people accurately. But, indeed, the requirements 
for belonging to the people are set, pre-voting, by the government or state. The state 
decides who counts and for how much, and in many ways, who will be represented. 
Still, the nation established as a "mechanism" for constructing the people (see above), 
allows the people to retain sovereignty conceptually and, in liberal democracies, this is 
done through the model of democratic function and practice, reminding us of our unity 
under one common rule. In this way, the electoral process brings the liberal democratic 
multitude of voters into the orb of the democratic nation.
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The concept of democracy in 
liberalism thus becomes a confusing mix of individual right, equality to voice opinions, 
public 'tolerance' for those living with conditions like poverty or disability continues to 
remain merely rhetorical in much of the political sphere, if these are addressed at all. 
54
Full German citizenship voting rights are still founded on the strict application ofjus 
sanguinis, the law of blood, requiring proof of"German ethnic origin". This is 
particularly an issue for immigrants, sometimes first, second and third generation, who 
achieve a kind of citizenship without democratic privilege. See Duncan Kelly, 
"Multicultural Citizenship: The Limitations of Liberal Democracy", in Political 
Quarterly 71(1), 2000: 31-41, p. 31. 
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and the always already pre-determined (in many respects) population of voters (voiced 
individuals); of the strange partnership of popular legitimation and the constraints of 
liberal constitutional state functioning; of inclusion on the one hand, and exclusion on the 
other. Even more disturbing in the retention of sovereign power (conceptually) by the 
people through the nation is the ability that the people's sovereignty then has to exclude. 
For even though the voters elect their representatives, they are only their representatives 
and any decision they make is understood to be the decision of the people. The 
exclusivity of the people in states which value the democratic process becomes, even 
more than in Hobbes, the demand of the people. In Hobbes, although "the king is the 
people", we are clearly to understand this as a mode of sovereign legitimation of an 
absolute power over the people - the king is the people, but sovereign power belongs to 
the individual (or counsel) who rules. In liberal democracies, the people, and indeed the 
individual, are protected and valued, and the sovereignty of the state belongs to the 
people, though it is exercised through the state. The government decides who may vote, 
as well as who may stay within state borders and who may benefit from state spending, 
but all of this is legitimated by the nation and thus authorized by the people through 
voting- at least conceptually and ideologically. Perhaps it is here that we can see 
Schmitt's critique of liberal democracy best illustrated. 
55 One may cite the fact of poor voter tum-out in liberal democratic elections and 
referenda to dispute this claim. I am interested here in the conceptual nature of voting -
the fact that many of a voting population do not vote (for any number of reasons) is 
another issue which deserves more careful attention than I can give here. Perhaps this 
trend supports the argument that sovereignty is still able to function at the same time as 
the myth of popular democratic foundation is called into question. 
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The 'people' is constituted foremost by the subjugation of various populations to a 
common law, as administered by a common power. Today, this subjugation is achieved 
through mechanisms of citizenship, 'naturalization', assimilation, and so forth. The 
common law is legitimated (in democracies) by the power of the voting public. The 
model of national unity, however, must always anticipate the constitution of the 'people' 
- as Etienne Balibar holds, the unification processes presuppose a specifically constituted 
ideology (Balibar, 1991: 93).56 The symbolic difference between 'us' and 'them' must be 
the difference that 'wins out'. But the 'people' is not one and the same with the ideal 
(idealized) nation, as the object of and as a necessity for patriotism. Rather, without a 
unified 'people', the nation appears as precisely what it is: an idea or arbitrary 
abstraction with no legitimation. The appeal of patriotism (nationalism) is addressed to 
no one, and the political force of the nation is crippled. 
Historically, we can see this clearly in the Third Estate; the Estate is a power; the nation 
is its representation, the 'people' is its 'natural' foundation. 57 The bourgeois formulation 
of national sovereignty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries consolidated the 
totalitarian image of modern sovereignty by 'historicizing' and 'universalizing' the image 
of the victorious bourgeoisie. It made "[n]ational particularity ... a potent universality" 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000: 105). The concept of the 'people's identity' formed in this 
56 By unification processes, it is helpful to think, as Balibar does, of wartime 
mobilization, the collective capacity to confront death as a group. 
57 This reading of Sieyes' Qu 'est-ce que le tiers etat, from Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 105. 
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period is one that incorporates the "spiritual essence" of the 'people' and the 'nation' as 
embedded within a territory, cultural meanings, a shared history, a linguistic community. 
National identity thus ensures a reinforcable legitimation of the 'nation' and the rights 
that exist for a sacred, unrestrained unity (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 105). The concept of 
sovereignty thus shifted decisively. When joined to the concept of the 'nation' and the 
'people', sovereignty shifts its "epicentre" from the mediation of conflicts and crises (the 
state of emergency) to the "unitary experience" of a "nation-subject" and its imagined 
community (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 105). 
It is in the context of these sovereign 'nations' that the present international community 
was formed and is maintained. Indeed, it is no accident that the largest non-religious, 
international apparatus is the United Nations. And its very name implies the desired 
unity of these diverse 'peoples', the unity of numerous collective popular wills, of 
'ethnic' groups. But again we see Mouffe's paradox. 5
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If everything that I (and others) 
have contended about nations is correct, the joining of them, the uniting of them in order 
to emphasize a universal humanity, seems counter-intuitive. The problem is not simple, 
however, for liberalism holds the basic unit of social and political thought ought to be the 
individual. A commitment to (non-Schmittian) democratic concepts is sensible because it 
allows for the voices of the multitude of individuals. The liberal commitment to the rule 
of law and legitimacy of the (minimal) state, however, requires the multitude to vote as 
individuals, but to be treated as equal members (with the same voice) of a 'people' to 
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ground the 'nation' and so legitimize the state. We see even more clearly through the 
lens of the nation the self-contradiction of 'liberal democracy'. 
There is ongoing debate in Western, economically advantaged states regarding the nature 
of state responsibility to foreign nationals and stateless persons, usually under the rubric 
of 'immigration policy'. On the one hand, arguments are made from the perspective of 
mutual human responsibility and benevolence (or charity) that immigration policies, 
particularly those regarding refugees, ought to be more (than less) open, and that there 
exists a duty to assist. On the other are arguments from the populist voice(s), which 
holds that borders which are more open to outsiders decrease national stability and 
endanger the nature of democracy. This debate is typical of the problems arising from 
what Mouffe calls "the conflict between democratic and liberal requirements" (Mouffe, 
2000: 37). 
Hobbesian states are all around us. The legitimacy of states is understood through their 
foundation on and embodiment of their nation- hence the term 'nation-state'. The 
location of sovereignty now resides in the 'nation' as that conceptual entity which, in 
turn, is founded upon and embodies the 'people's' will. The will of the 'people' is 
understood, in liberal democratic states, to be ascertained by the exercise of democratic 
principles. The public will becomes a matter ofnon-Schmittian politics. But this basis of 
democracy justifies state existence and enables mechanisms of state population control. 
58 See above. 
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'Peoples' are constructed by nation-states, and their boundaries are as constructed. But it 
becomes the job of the state to maintain these boundaries, to create states of emergency in 
which it must exercise its decision. Some states do this in relatively 'innocuous' terms 
by, as mentioned above, limiting the allowable entrance of immigrants and refugees; 
others in relatively 'radical' terms, by setting about the homogenization of the population 
through elimination: expulsion and ethnic cleansing. Both of these types of measures are 
increasingly common, around the world, often under the guise of 'nationalism'. This fact 
is particularly compelling when one considers the spread and influence of the processes 
of globalization - of communication, capital, and technological infrastructure. The 
borders of nations appear, quite literally, to be increasingly porous, sovereignty 
increasingly questioned. In the following chapter, I will examine this more closely and 
argue that the reason we see more and more incidents of 'nationalism' is directly linked 
to the questioning of the use of sovereign states and the rise of universalist liberalism 
through the forces of globalization. 
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Democracies and Liberal Constitutional States 
Democratically elected regimes (sometimes re-elected or reaffirmed) routinely ignore 
limits on their power (defined by state constitution) and deprive their citizens of dignity 
and freedom. The former Yugoslavia, Peru, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, the Philippines, and 
the Palestinian Authority hold or have held elections to determine their rule. Yet all 
maintain governments or state structures which do not coincide with or, in some cases, 
even qualify as, tolerable to those with liberal democratic sensibilities. By 'liberal 
democratic' I mean to refer to (primarily Western) political systems characterized by 
free, fair elections as well as by the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the 
protection of basic human liberties, or 'rights', particularly to property and person, but 
also to assembly, religious freedom, and so forth. But indeed, as Fareed Zakaria, the 
former editor of Foreign Affairs (periodical), rightly notes, an increasing number of 
democratic countries are, in fact, illiberal. 5
9 
More interesting, perhaps, is Zakaria's 
observation that few 'illiberal' democracies have "matured" into liberal democracies 
(Zakaria, 1997: 24). It is this claim that I will focus on here; for this observation, cloaked 
though it is in neo-liberal, paternalistic language, appears to have some truth to it, if one 
observes the prevalence of "democracy" in the international arena in correspondence with 
the increasing numbers of refugees, displaced persons, and incidents of ethnic cleansing 
and genocide. This disturbing trend deserves some attention and I propose to pay that 
attention here. 
59 Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy", in Foreign Affairs 76(6), Nov/Dec. 
1997: pg. 24; hereafter cited in the text as (Zakaria, 1997: page). 
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States holding relatively competitive (more than one name on the ballot), multiparty 
elections are states we call democratic; and the more participation they allow, the more 
democratic they are considered. But many of these do not fit into the framework of 
constitutional liberalism. Constitutional liberalism refers to the tradition that values and 
seeks to provide protection for individual autonomy and dignity while faced with the 
reality of necessary coercion. It is the result of a combination of two concepts, most 
often attributed to John Locke. It is liberal in its philosophical emphasis on individual 
liberty, and constitutional in its assertion that properly organized society must rest on the 
rule of law. The result is a system of checks and balances, most notably a separation of 
powers, to ensure that the power of government is unable to interfere with those liberties 
or rights of individuals which are understood to be inviolable. For the government is 
conceptually composed of individuals equal in liberty and right to all other societal 
members, but who happen to be suited for leadership. The sovereign power of such a 
society resides in the agreement of its citizens to live together peacefully, by the Golden 
Rule, and to pool their individual sovereignty. Democracy, it seems, originated in this 
type of system as a means to waylay conflict within society. Constitutional liberalism, it 
seems, often leads at least to some minimal form of democracy, but democracy cannot, of 
itself, move into (constitutional) liberalism. 
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Chapter III 
State Legitimation and the International Order 
In the end, however, elections trump everything. If a country holds elections, 
Washington and the world will tolerate a great deal from the resulting 
government ... elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the 
rule of law?) 
Fareed Zakaria 
In the previous two chapters, I have dealt mainly with issues of sovereignty and 
nationhood. I began by arguing that Hobbes' sovereign is best understood as a 
Schmittian democracy, as a power which is representative, absolutist, and exclusive. I 
also alluded to the presence of these sovereign states within the present world order. I 
followed, in Chapter Two, with a historical examination of the conceptualization of 
nations (as arising from peoplehoods) and their normative force in the legitimation of 
states. I argued that, given our conception of Hobbesian state legitimation (that it 
requires the accord of the people), we (at least in the present non-Islamic West) look to 
electoral democracy as a mode of governance to legitimate the sovereignty of a given 
state. Throughout, I maintained that the 'nation' and the 'people' are post-state 
constructions, largely the result of, though portrayed as the justification for, nation-state 
sovereignty. I now want to carve out a place for such Hobbesian sovereign (Schmittian 
democratic) states in the international theatre; that is, to locate them within the 
international community. 
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I characterize the international theatre as a system based originally on an ideal of peaceful 
relations between states, but one which allows a great many Hobbesian sovereign states, 
that is, Schmittian democracies to participate. The international community does this by 
encouraging and fostering plebiscitary democracies in non-liberal, non-constitutional 
states. I contend that this is the case because we are again experiencing a crisis of the 
nation-state, this time threatened by the forces of globalization. In Hobbes' era, the crisis 
of the nation-state required a conception of sovereignty for the citizens, in order to 
prevent the threat of civil war. Today, it is the international community which requires 
proof of a nation's internal sovereignty. The function of democracy, as the signpost of 
legitimate sovereignty, has a pivotal role because of the nation-state's engagement with 
the global community, spiritually headed by the liberally-backed, predominantly Western 
United Nations. By portraying the United Nations in a certain way, I hope to show that 
the apparent elements of contradiction found between the Hobbesian and United Nations 
versions of sovereign power and international relations, when considered with those 
aspects of their theories which mesh with one another, highlight the Schmittian critique 
of the opposition of democracy and liberalism. 
In the first section of this chapter, I outline a liberal conception of legitimate sovereign 
formation and rule as originating in the Hobbesian tradition. I then offer an explanation 
as to why liberal democracies do, in fact, seem to 'work', despite the conflictual nature of 
democracy and liberalism which I dealt with earlier. In section two, I argue that if non-
liberal, non-democratic nations are to become liberal democracies they require 
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liberalization, and not the democratization largely imposed by the international 
community. Whether these nations ought, normatively speaking, to be democratized or 
liberalized is a problem which I leave largely to one side. I tum to sub-Saharan Africa to 
exemplify the nature of non-liberal or illiberal democracy, and use the work of Fareed 
Zakaria to illustrate the contemporary Western/international approach to illiberal, non-
democratic nations. I argue that the West is content to allow nations to remain illiberal so 
long as they are 'democratic' (or democratic enough), because it is in democracy that the 
international community identifies legitimate sovereign formation and global market 
acceptability. In the final section, I draw directly on the goals, history, and values of the 
United Nations and argue that the reason why legitimate national sovereignty is important 
to the international community has to do with the role of the UN in privileging such 
sovereignty and in the present crisis of the nation-state. 
3.1 The Liberal State and Sovereignty 
It is the conception of legitimate sovereign formation and rule (by social contract), if 
nothing else, that the political theory of liberal states retains from Hobbes. Liberal 
political theory holds that a mode of validating laws relies on the (democratically 
established) constitutional institution, the legal state, which ensures the legitimacy of 
law. 60 This is so on the basis of democratic procedure. Laws themselves (specific laws) 
are considered democratically established if the procedure by which they are legislated 
72 
(in general) is democratically established (Habermas, 1996: 47). The rule of law in 
liberal constitutional states relies on a conception of democratically established 
legitimacy. In liberal democracies, we elect the representatives who make and enact laws 
and, unless they act in complete opposition to the manner in which they told us they 
would, they do so largely without our direct input. In fact, it is often the case that the 
publicly voiced opposition to laws goes unheeded by our representatives. 61 Still, we 
generally understand such situations to fall under the rule of law of our states, and we 
understand such laws to have been created by the will of the people. In the case of 
illiberal democracies, which I will discuss at length later, the power of the sovereign law, 
understood by virtue of an election to be the will of the people, is often used against the 
people who's power it holds. 
Philosophical or ideological liberalism is distinguished by its emphasis on negative 
political liberties (with or without social welfare commitments), most often requiring 
equal respect for all members of a political community (from very small communities to 
60 See Jtirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (trans. William Rehg) (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), section 3 .1 , for a detailed discussion of Hobbes' role in the 
theory of legal legitimacy. 
61 As a recent example, the public opposition to military combat, both before and during 
the coalition attack on Iraq (2003), in the US and in Britain. A number of well publicized 
polls indicating strong public disapproval of state military action went seemingly unheard 
by both the US and UK leaderships. 
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the community of human beings as a whole). 62 It is only fitting, then, that political 
liberalism seeks to ensure representation of 'the people', person by person, through 
democratic process - that is, by voting. It makes little sense in a society that values (in 
general) individual autonomy not to ask each autonomous individual to decide upon the 
way in which her negative liberties are best protected. Furthermore, if we understand 
stable legitimacy of states to be based upon the authority of the people through 
representative constitutionalism, then democratic voting and political principles are 
absolutely necessary to the functioning of sovereign power. 
Liberalism remains, both ideologically and philosophically, closely tied and often 
ardently committed to an ethic of human equality. This tie and commitment may be 
based upon, for example, our rational nature (as in Kant), our existence as solely the 
property of God (as in Locke), or more generally, a belief in the equality of human worth 
and dignity based on an accompanying belief in mutual human empathy and compassion. 
Generally speaking, these approaches mandate, for one reason or another (fear of 
inconsistency, fear of God, fear of personal emotional pain, respectively), the belief, at 
least on a conceptual level, in human equality of inalienable right, liberty, or power 
(sometimes accompanied by obligation or duty). John Rawls famously held that each 
62 Of the many works written by philosophical liberals on philosophical liberalism, I find 
John Rawls' work the most interesting and likely the most representative, in many ways, 
of the American liberalism of present. See especially his Political Liberalism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), and "Reply to Habermas", in the Journal of Philosophy, 
March 1995. 
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individual is entitled to as extensive a range of liberties as is possible such that there is 
liberty and like liberty for all (Rawls, 1993: 22-28). Insofar as individuals have rights, 
liberties, or powers which are inalienable from them, all differences are to be set aside, 
ideologically speaking at least, and tolerance is to rule - that is, if those things which 
differentiate us from one another do not impinge upon our rights, liberties, or powers to 
act and live as we see fit, those differences are not to be considered important. In other 
words, difference which makes no difference is both superfluous and spurious.63 
But as I have shown in Chapter Two, the democracy of the Schmittian political not only 
requires difference and differential boundary; these boundaries are definable, in 
Schmittian terms, on any basis of difference, many of which, in the minds of most 
committed liberals, 'make no difference': race, religion, language, and so forth. Even 
within liberal communities, the democratic process demarcates between community 
members and the world 'outside' of the community, between those who are included and 
those who are excluded.64 
63 I take this idea out of context, but I think it expresses an important feature of a certain 
form of liberalism. The original expression reads, "a purported difference which makes 
no difference at all is spurious", and it is based on the writing of Charles S. Peirce in 
Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and deliberation (London: 
Routledge,2000),p.59. 
64 I do not mean to imply that many liberals are not cosmopolitans, I mean that the nature 
of liberal states and their smaller sub-communities requires demarcation, inside from 
outside, members from non-members. This is the case even if we acknowledge our 
commitments to one another as people living on the same planet and not just to one 
another as fellow citizens, nationals, and so forth. 
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The nature of sovereign power, when necessarily related to democratic foundation, has 
the potential to become more vicious than what we can imagine of even a Hobbesian 
sovereign. When tied, necessarily, to the authorization of the people, in the absence of 
liberalism, the nature of sovereign power becomes a true Schmittian dictator - a 
decisionist power which makes crises in order to require its own decision on the state of 
exception, a power which makes spaces in which to exterminate heterogeneity. This 
power recognizes not only its need to be legitimated by the authority of the people, but 
also its need to base its unity on a principle of popular homogeneity, a principle which it 
chooses. The rise in nationalism (both relatively peaceful and brutally violent), incidents 
of ethnic cleansing, and ever-growing refugee camps,65 all signal that there are higher 
numbers of excluded persons from their own communities (often from any community at 
all), even as there are more democratic elections held around the world. 
The liberal state maintains a distinction between the establishment and voice of the nation 
(the people) and the sovereign power; an aspect of the 'separation of powers'. The 
65 A United Nations High Commissariat of Refugees (UNHCR) spokesperson remarked 
in 1994 on the disarray facing the international community since the end of the Cold War. 
She said that whereas the UNHCR used to function as a body of international lawyers 
working to ensure refugee protection, they now perform what is better referred to as an 
emergency response. Between 1974 and 1994, there was an increase in the number of 
international refugees from 2.4 million people to 23 million people. See J. Darnton, "UN 
swamped by a world awash with refugees. We can't cope with the crisis", International 
Herald Tribune, 9 August, 1994. The ongoing civil war in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, and continuing unrest and conflict 
in Islamic states, to name a few, have ensured an accelerated pattern of growth on this 
front. As of 1 January, 2003, the estimated number of so-called 'Persons of Concern' 
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constitutional government is given sovereign power, thus allowing the power of 
liberalism over democracy. In the interest of individual autonomy and right, the liberal 
state keeps the democratic body and power 1in check1• This is necessary in a world of 
financially interdependent states which are aimed, if not at domestic and international 
peace, then at economic profitability (Wali, 2000: 5). States in which the rule of law is 
not visible or powerful are seen by the international community as politically unstable 
and therefore a bad investment/trading partner. As Maria Livanos Cattaui, Secretary-
General of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) said, 11 [t]he inescapable 
conclusion is that good governance, a transparent and predictable regulatory framework, 
the rule of law and a stable society all contribute to a hospitable investment climate 11 (op. 
cit. Wali, 2000: 5). 
As we see time and again in nations around the world, questioning the sovereign 
authority in states without liberal constitutional bases often leads to an increase of 
violence against the people at the hands of their government. It seems that, in these 
particular states - Columbia, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, to name a few - a threat (or 
perceived threat, or possible pre-threat behaviour66) to the internal legitimacy of 
sovereign power is followed by an increased use of the sovereign decision and sovereign 
violence. Regimes of this kind not only use violent coercion and the threat of violence as 
who fall under the mandate of the UNHCR was 20.5 million (up from 19.8 million in 
2001). See www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/. 
66 1 should note that 'threat' to sovereign legitimacy can, as in the case of the German 
Jews, manifest as a threat that was simply decided upon. The sovereign decision in such 
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a demonstration of power, they do so to create crises to which they can respond with 
67 force. 
3.2 Illiberal Democracies 
Democratization has occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa at an incredibly fast rate. 
Democracy began in the region in the 1960s, following the granting of independence to 
many African states from their former colonial rulers. But as the Nigerian Ambassador 
to Argentina, Mohammad Ahmad Wali, wrote in 2000, 11 it should be pointed out that 
while some countries operated multi-party [systems], others adopted one [party] 
[systems] 11 (Wali, 2000: 1). Furthermore, before the 11 consolidation of democracy 11 in 
those countries, "military coups and counter coups and emergence of dictatorships began 
in most of the countries, starting with Togo in 1963 and by 1985, more than half of [sub-
Saharan Africa] was under one kind of dictatorship or another11 (Wali, 2000: 1). In 1990, 
many of the francophone (former French colonial) African states lifted their bans on 
multiparty politics, all within six months of one another (Zakaria, 1997: 28). Elections 
have been held in most of the sub-Saharan states since 1991, but many of these have not 
improved the general living conditions of their citizens. One observer has remarked that 
the overemphasis on multiparty elections in Africa has accompanied a 'corresponding 
a case creates the threat, builds the crisis for the people, and acts to remedy it. 
67 This is, perhaps, most interesting conceptually in the context of 'ethnic' fighting, in 
civil war, or in nationalist-based genocide. But this is a large topic, which is out of my 
reach here. 
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neglect' of the basic tenets of liberal governance.68 Democratically elected governments 
or regimes, sometimes only re-elected or reaffirmed from previous non-democratic rule, 
routinely ignore limits on their power and deprive their citizens of even constitutionally 
declared dignities and freedoms.
69 
In essence, what writers like Fareed Zakaria argue is 
that while the West tries to liberalize the world's nations through democracy, the only 
way to achieve liberal-democracy is through constitutional liberalization. We confuse, he 
argues, constitutional liberalism, which refers to the tradition that values and seeks to 
provide protection for individual autonomy and dignity through the rule of law, with 
liberal democracy, a political system characterized by free, fair elections, as well as by 
the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the protection of basic human rights 
(liberties), particularly to property and person (Zakaria, 1997: 24-26). It is for this reason 
that we see the rise in incidents of the 'illiberal' democratic phenomenon worldwide 
(Zakaria, 1997: 28). By confusing liberal constitutionalism with liberal democracy, the 
West mistakenly assumes that we can improve the lives of individuals living in non-
liberal, undemocratic nations through the democratization of their electoral systems.70 
68 
Michael Chege op. cit. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy", in Foreign 
Affairs, 76(6), Nov./Dec. 1997: p. 28. 
69 This is not restricted to the African continent. The former Yugoslavia, Peru, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, and many others, have all held 'democratic' elections, but have refused 
or been unable to provide better levels of treatment and living conditions for their 
electoral body. See the Human Rights section of the United Nations website 
(www.un.org). Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) also has information on these 
states and others. 
70 
There are multiple UN press releases on this subject. See, for example, HR/CN/937, 
"Resolution on Promotion of Democracy Adopted by Human Rights Commission" (28 
April, 1999). 
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While it is true that in states in which there has been a tradition of constitutional 
liberalism of some form (often in former British colonies) political democracy often takes 
hold quite well, states which have instituted democratic elections without such a history 
often have social systems which do not improve. Worse, in some cases, the incidents of 
nationalism and politics delineated upon 'ethnic' or 'racial' grounds can actually manifest 
themselves in ways which create even worse living situations. 
Not unlike Schmitt, Zakaria holds that the difference between constitutional liberalism 
and democracy turns on the concept of power: "[c]onstitutionalliberalism is about the 
limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use" (Zakaria, 1997: 30). 
Indeed, democracy has traditionally been seen, by thinkers like Kant, as an undermining 
force of good government and a peaceful system of well-ordered states (Kant, 1970: 
10 1). But unlike Schmitt, Zakaria holds that the reason for this lies in the positive effect 
of the liberal state's interest in the market. I elaborate on this point in what follows. 
3.3 Neo-Liberalism and Democratic Peace 
Zakaria holds that constitutional government is the cornerstone of successful economic 
reform policy (Zakaria, 1997: 33). The protection of individual rights (especially those 
regarding property), along with principles of liberal governance (the separation of 
powers, the rule of law) are the factors which lead, in proportion to the level at which 
these principles are imposed within the state, to "capitalism and economic success" 
(Zakaria, 1997: 34). As Alan Greenspan, US Federal Reserve Chair, concluded in a 1997 
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speech to US Congress, "the guiding mechanism of a free market economy ... is a bill of 
rights, enforced by an impartial judiciary" (op cit. Zakaria, 1997: 34). And while Wali 
writes more from the perspective of someone living in sub-Saharan Africa, his own 
words reflect a similar outlook and confusion regarding the relationship of liberalism, 
democracy, and the market. On building democratic infrastructure, he cites first and 
foremost "subordination of the polity to the rule of law; strengthening the judiciary; and 
facilitating economic growth" as the necessary elements of policy (Wali, 2000: 8). As 
Zakaria argues, we strongly associate the presence of democracy with the presence of 
individual rights found in constitutional liberal states, and because of this we make a 
habit of mistakenly taking the forces of democracy for the forces of civil peace within the 
state, and peace and multicultural harmony between states. 
One approach to international affairs that is epitomized, in many ways, by Zakaria's 
writing on illiberal democracy, assumes not only that "mature" liberal democracies 
accommodate 'ethnic pluralism', difference of opinion, religion, and an ethic of individual 
autonomy through the force of ideologically liberal state functioning (Zakaria, 1997: 35). 
This approach also holds that these states routinely 'live' in peace with other liberal 
democracies, both longstanding and relatively new, known in the study of international 
relations as the principle of 'democratic peace'. In neo-Kantian fashion, theorists hold 
that in liberal democracies, it is the public who pays for wars, and as citizens with 
decisive powers over state action, liberal democratic citizens will be cautious with regard 
to engagement in armed conflict (and indeed, in any form of behaviour that will cause 
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tensions between nations and instability in the market)71 (Zakaria, 1997: 36). The claim 
is that states in which the people understands itself as paying financially for war will not 
be so likely to support the state's engagement in armed conflict. What is important to 
note here is that this holds only in relations between democracies; liberal democracies do 
not have a good track record of maintaining peace with non-democratic states (Zakaria, 
1997: 36). Could this explain why, if the powerful states internationally are liberal 
democracies which have a tendency to war with non-democratic states, those non-
democracies would want to establish democratic elections? It would certainly be 
advantageous to establish at least the trappings of democratic process if it meant avoiding 
the wrath or unsolicited intervention of powerful liberal democratic states in a regime's 
daily affairs. Could the fact that many 'developing' nations rely on the liberally-backed 
World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the United Nations, for loans and 
development funds, lead non-democratic states to conform to liberal conceptions of state 
legitimacy (i.e., principles of democratic foundation)? As Wali comments, seemingly 
without negativity, 
With the cessation of the cold war, coupled with the tremendous success of liberal 
economics, and concerted efforts of the donor communities to promote good governance 
in Africa, more than two third [sic.] of [sub-Saharan Africa] is under the influence of 
democracy ... the emergence and the concept of good governance in the early 1990s, 
71 I should note that we seem bid by Kant to understand those who fund war (the public) 
as able to refuse payment, which at this point seems sadly utopian. Immanuel Kant, 
"Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", in Kant's Political Writings (Hans Reiss, 
ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 93-130. As an aside, Henry 
David Thoreau's essay "Civil Disobedience" (1849) (New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 1993) advocates refusing to pay taxes when one knows that one's money is going to 
make citizens into cannon fodder, into men who "serve the State ... as machines, with 
their bodies", p.3. 
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[was] initiated by the World Bank, IMP and donor communities [which supports] 
democratization in developing countries.72 
Perhaps the Western desire for open market space, added to the push from the liberal left 
to increase human rights and dignities for all people, have led us to focus entirely too 
much on democracy as the pre-eminent marker of nation-state legitimacy, or at least of 
market acceptability. 
What Zakaria rightly observes is that the democratic peace of international relations is 
actually liberal peace. This is a notion that has a long tradition, particularly for 
philosophical liberals, most notably elucidated in Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace.73 
For Kant, 'democracies' were not included in his category of "republican" states, those 
which he held to be able to maintain not only domestic harmony, but also international 
peace and security (Kant, 1970: 100-102).74 This contrasts starkly with Antonio Negri's 
reading of Machiavellian republicanism -- as always exhibiting constituent power which 
72 Mohammad Ahmad Wali, "Africa: Viability and Challenges", 2000, p.2. 
73 John Rawls' The Law of Peoples is, in many ways, a more detailed, modernized 
version of Kant's Perpetual Peace, as Rawls intended it to be. 
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is the product of an 'immanently' social dynamic of conflictual counterpowers; "social 
conflict is the basis of the stability of power and the logic of the [Machiavellian] city's 
expansion" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 162). Kant's republicanism, on the other hand, 
consisted in the separation and balance of powers, the mechanisms of checks on power, 
the rule of law, the emphasis on protection of individual rights, and representative (to 
some extent) government (Kant, 1970: 102). He focused on the stability of such states, 
largely the result of the rule of law. He firmly believed in the possibility of 'perpetual' 
peace, but only between those states which he held to be properly republics - those 
states which could rely on their common constitutional liberal 'character'. This 
'character' consists in a mutual respect for the rights of one another's citizens; a common 
form of checks and balances on power, ensuring a trust between nations that no leader 
could make his citizens war; and most importantly, a classical liberal economic polic/5 
common to all republics - an internationally based domestic market economy, 
emphasizing trade. He understood the latter requirement to create an interdependence 
between states that renders conflict undesirable (costly) and cooperation advantageous 
74 Kant holds that in order for peace to be obtained and secured, the first definitive article 
of such a constitution must be that the civil constitution (ius civitatis) of every state be 
what he called 'republican'. I distinguish between his use of the word and the way in 
which it is often used (referring to a state which is governed by a body actually elected by 
the citizens) because Kant is sometimes called a civic republican. A republican 
constitution, for Kant, is necessarily founded upon a principle of freedom for all members 
of a society, a principle of dependence of all members on a single, common legislation, 
law, and power, and finally, a principle of legal equality for all members "as citizens". 
He does not believe in equal voting or proportional representation, although he thinks that 
republics are essentially representative. This is clearly in sharp contrast to Machiavellian 
republicanism, described above. See Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace", p. 99-104. 
75 I am thinking here of Adam Smith. 
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(financially useful)(Kant, 1970: 104 ). If the international community is effectively 
following in the Kantian tradition, it is nowhere clearer than in Zakaria's assertions not 
only that democratic peace is liberal peace, but also that 11 [h]istorically, the factors most 
closely associated with full-fledged liberal democracies are capitalism, a bourgeoisie, and 
a high per capita GNP 11 (Zakaria, 1997: 27-28). 
In spite, it seems, of his own good sense, Zakaria still finds it 11 odd 11 that his own nation, 
the United States, is 11 so often the advocate of elections and plebiscitary democracy 
abroad 11 (Zakaria, 1997: 39). And it is, indeed, particularly odd if one considers how 
distinctive the US is, as a democracy, in the number of constraints its constitution places 
upon electoral majorities. The US Supreme Court, for example, is led by nine unelected 
citizens who all hold life tenure - the largest unelected body in a democracy, save the 
British House of Lords who hold no constitutional power. Perhaps, as Zakaria offers, this 
reflects a system based on an 11 avowedly pessimistic conception of human nature 11 
(Zakaria, 1997: 39), much like Hobbes'. Regardless, democracy is part of what Zakaria 
calls the 11 fashionable attire 11 of today's political environment; it seems, he writes, as 
though there are no 11respectable 11 alternatives (Zakaria, 1997: 42). But as he rightly 
concludes, the problems of governance are often those occurring within democracy itself, 
complicated by the connection between democratic elections and state legitimacy. 
Zakaria's position illustrates the manner in which much of the Western, or at least North 
American, world understands the issues of democracy and liberalism. What he is talking 
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about, it seems, in illiberal democracies are actually subaltern nations 76 - nations which 
are disenfranchised or simply less privileged than many nations in the world. The 
subaltern nation is that state which must use the concept of the sovereign nation, either 
for the good of the 'people' or for the power of the ruler, to maintain viable statehood in 
the eyes of the international community. The post-imperialist age, in which many former 
colonies have attained their 'independence', or lack of colonial domination, left us with a 
legacy of national liberation movements. The nation is understood in this context as not 
only a mechanism of protection from external forces that infringe upon its constitution, 
but also as a sign of unity, community, and stability (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 125). 
National sovereignty now means the freedom from foreign domination and the defeat of 
colonial rule. On the negative side, the national sovereignty of state actors almost always 
requires powerful networks of internal domination (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 125), what 
Wali seems to be describing as the situation of pre-consolidated democracies, i.e., 
dictatorships (Wali, 2000: 1). Remember that, based on my argument (simply put), the 
crisis of modernity, the crisis of state legitimacy, begets absolutist and exclusive 
sovereignty which supports the concept of the nation, only complete with the democratic 
foundation of the people. The unity of the people into the nation (and thus the legitimacy 
of sovereignty) must be understood to be originary and democratic, and not the result of 
the sovereign decision. Therefore, particularly in subaltern nations, the projected unity of 
the people must be protected. The sovereign decision must be repeatedly in effect to 
76 Rawls would call these 'burdened societies'. See The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 90, 105-113. 
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overcome any difference (most easily identified, in a relatively homogeneous population, 
in a questioning of sovereign decision or power). The elimination of projected (or 
projectable) difference within the nation allows the sovereign to properly represent the 
group as a whole. The construction of national identity seems to guarantee a continually 
reinforced legitimation of the sovereign and the state, embodying all of the rights of a 
unity. It is for this reason that theorists like Hardt and Negri describe nationalism, 
particularly in the subaltern state context, as political and economic modernism, as a 
revolution of the people given to the bourgeoisie via representative sovereignty (Hardt 
and Negri, 2000: 42-43). 
The international community (or as Zakaria himself notes, largely the United States) 
seems committed to the world holding 'free and fair' elections. Optimistically speaking, 
the international community holds these commitments because there is a belief in the 
power of the people, not only to choose leaders who will not harm them, who will be 
'decent', but also as capable of authoring their own government, the representation of 
their own sovereign power. Pessimistically, it has these commitments because it sees, in 
the democratic foundation of government, a sufficient condition for a government's 
legitimate sovereignty and thus ability to engage in the global market. Based on Samir 
Amin's reading of economic capitalism, capital continually functions to make 
boundaries, dividing the world into polar opposites of rich and poor, powerful and 
powerless (Amin, 1998). On this reading, the chasm between the two poles becomes 
more and more insurmountable each time boundaries are drawn; "the polarized world ... 
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is and will be more and more inhuman and explosive" (Amin, 1998: 75). If the capitalist 
system needs boundaries in order to have a place into which it can expand, there will 
continue to be cycles of inclusion and exclusion of certain types of national markets. The 
force of trade sanctions (exclusion) on non-democratic, illiberal nations serves both to 
create the perception of 'untouchable' markets for the rest of the international community 
and the impetus to overcome such market boundaries (the challenge of capital). And all 
the while, such nations are shown the impossibility of their own economic stability and 
prosperity, that is, their dependence. A nation having a "capitalist economy, a 
bourgeoisie, and a strong GNP" 77 is not only considered beneficial to that state and its 
people, it also benefits the entire market by expanding its boundaries, or overcoming old 
boundaries only to create new ones.78 
But it cannot be a mystery why illiberal states holding democratic elections do not 
"mature" (Zakaria, 1997: 36) into liberal democracies. And it should not be a surprise 
that non-democratic, illiberal sovereign powers perceive that 'free and fair' elections can 
be held in order to reaffirm their own power, this time with the support of at least part of 
the international community, as well as the authorization of 'the people'. In the following 
section, I explore the history, goals, and values of the international community (the UN) 
77 See above. 
78 See any number of works on capitalism and the global market. For example, Samir 
Amin, Capitalism in the Age of Globalization: The Management of Contemporary 
Society (London: Zed Books, 1998). 
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and the ways in which these are linked to democratic formation and populist authority. I 
begin with the contemporary crisis of the nation-state. 
3.4 The United Nations and the Present International System 
The phenomenon which is widely referred to as the 'crisis of the nation-state', "the 
declining power of nation-states in the international context" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 4), 
is not new; the crisis of modernity and of sovereign state legitimacy theorized by Hobbes 
(among others, e.g., Jean Bodin) constitutes an earlier version of this situation. What is 
new in the present manifestation of the crisis of modem state sovereignty is the 
established conception of sovereign legitimacy in relation to the increasingly integrated 
global order. The present crisis is understood to be the result of a conflict between the 
sovereignty of particular states and their interdependence with one another, through the 
forces of globalization. This contrasts with the crisis of Hobbes' era in which the 
problem was understood to occur within the state - sovereignty required legitimation in 
the minds of the subjects, at the same time as the sovereignty of states was assumed 
under conceptual frameworks like the 1648 Peace ofWestphalia.79 This time, nation-
state sovereignty requires legitimacy in the minds of the international community, at the 
same time as the practical boundaries of states become increasingly porous. 
79 For a good, concise review of the details of the Peace of Westphalia and a thorough 
looks at the 'balance of powers' see Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of the Great 
Powers: 1648-1815 (London: Longman, 1983). 
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The inception of the United Nations, at the end of World War II, served to consolidate 
and enrich an already developing international order, at first European, but increasingly 
global: "The United Nations, in effect, can be regarded as the culmination of this entire 
constitutive process, a culmination that both reveals the limitations of the notion of 
international order and points beyond it toward a new notion of global order" (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: 4). The UN may be said to be influential in the present crisis of the nation-
state (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 4). 
It is true that the UN is effectively the join between the transformation from an 
international state order to a global one. In the first place, the conceptual structure of the 
UN is founded upon the legitimation and recognition of such legitimation of particular 
nation-state sovereignty. It began and remains embedded within a structure of state rights 
in the international community laid out by treaty, and other written and unwritten 
agreements. In the second place, though, the legitimation of state sovereignty is 
recognized (and thus made effective) through the transfer of sovereign state right to a 
transcendent international location. However, the conception of right (both of the state 
and of the individual) defined by the United Nations Charte/0 might itself be pushing us 
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"The Organization and its Members ... shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles. 1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
its Members. 2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits 
resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the present Charter.", etc .. United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 2, Charter 
of the United Nations, www.un.org. 
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toward a new source of normativity, effective globally, that can act as a sovereign source 
of juridicature (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 4). The United Nations, for my purposes, is a 
representative of what is best called the international or interstate community. This 
'community', however, is still best thought of as predominantly international only in the 
non-Islamic West. While it is unarguably global in its outlook, the control of its practical 
function (and of its normative foundation) remains largely confined to North American 
and Western European states. 
In the first few decades of the twentieth century, thinkers like Hans Kelsen, 
foreshadowing the formation of the UN, envisioned an international system, the laws of 
which could stand as the source of each and every national legislative formation and 
constitution. The model of international order could not be based on the legitimation of 
states, as thinkers like Hobbes would have us do; the international order ought not to be 
understood as comprised of state actors, likened to the individual subjects of a state. 
Instead, state legitimation must come from the top down. The form and structure of the 
nation-state, for Kelsen, was unable to realize the idea of international, transcendent right 
- a conception of right that could beget an "organization of humanity" (Kelsen, 1952: 
"The General Assembly, Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that 
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, 
shall strive ... to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive 
measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition 
and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction." United Nations, "Preamble", Universal 
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586), based on a similar notion of transcendent right, both of individual people and of 
sovereign peoples. 
In thinking of the constitution of such a transcendent international organization, Hardt 
and Negri hold that the majority of theorists have, against Kelsen's recommendation, 
turned to models of state legitimation (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 6). Those models that 
were present during the 1birth of the nation-state1 were proposed again, stratified to the 
international level and emphasizing the ruling sovereign, to prescribe and analyze the 
constitution of an international force and structure, so-called 11 domestic analogies 11 •81 The 
Hobbesian variant of these models relies on the social contract formation of legitimate 
sovereignty. The constitution of the international sovereign entity is conceived as a 
contractual agreement based on the contextual transfer of sovereign title of independent 
nation-state subjects. That is to say, with regard to the subjects/citizens, the state itself is 
understood to be sovereign; but in the context of interstate relations (and those issues 
pertaining to 1humanity', on some models) the transcendent right is contained in an 
international sovereign. It is based on the idea of the Hobbesian state of nature among 
individual nation-states, but unlike Hobbes1 view of international relations, this model 
holds that state actors, like individual persons, can overcome the state of nature in which 
Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
217 A (III) of 10 December, 1948. 
81 State actors are imagined as individual personal actors, and the state sovereign as some 
form of international sovereign. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: 
Macmillan, 1977). 
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they find themselves. For Hobbes this is not possible because the there is never room for 
more than one sovereign in a peaceful social arrangement. This model82 presents the new 
global sovereign structure as an analogue of classical conceptions of national state 
sovereignty (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 6). 
The result of these two approaches to legitimate international sovereignty, the 
overarching juridical (or top-down) approach and the domestic analogy (or bottom-up) 
approach, is the power of the United Nations. The UN joins a transcendent juridical 
system with the practical contracts of peace between nations in legitimating itself as an 
international sovereign power. Its structure allows it to work conceptually from both 
directions (top-down and bottom-up), but also positions it as a source of conceptual 
conflict regarding state legitimacy and proper domestic functioning. The UN is not 
based, strictly speaking, on a Hobbesian variant of the domestic analogy. The UN is 
clearly meant to embody, at some level, a structural unification of agreeing nation-states; 
but if the sovereignty of the nation-state is again visibly in question, as it seems to be, this 
has to do with another aspect of the 'join' between juridicature and international contract 
within the United Nations. The legitimate transfer of sovereign power to a transcendent 
international location comes from two opposite directions: from the agreement between 
82 There are other models of the domestic analogy, most notably, one based on John 
Locke's theory of commonwealth formation. The Lockean analogy proposes a "global 
constitutionalism" or the "overcoming of state imperatives" through a global civil 
society, and "focuses on the counterpowers that animate the constitutive process and 
support the supranational power." See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 7. 
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states to meet under an international sovereign and from a formalist conceptual structure 
(which is thus able to accommodate non-agreeing states), a political power able to 
transcend and thus globalize (universalize) the relations of state and individual actors. 83 
The Hobbesian variant of the domestic analogy thus effectively represents part of the 
motivation and thrust of the UN's international sovereignty and legitimacy. It is through 
the Hobbesian sovereign that states are expected to legitimate their sovereign power and 
autonomy enough to qualify as a member of the international community. It was Kelsen 
who was rightly concerned to find a fundamental normative source and command capable 
of both supporting a new global order and of prohibiting a fall into global anarchy; but it 
is precisely this conceptual outlook that is now thought to threaten the sovereignty of the 
nation-state. 
The nation-state now remains caught in the middle of an international system which 
wants it to be sovereign over its people insofar as it is responsible for them as citizens, 
but as interdependent as possible with other states (to ensure its market share). The 
vision of the United Nations is a world in which nations join together, as equal members 
83 See "Membership", Chapter II (Art. 3-6), in the UN Charter, as well as Chapters XI 
and XII (Art. 73-85), entitled, respectively, "Declaration regarding non-self-governing 
territories" and "International trusteeship system". 
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of a global community, under the transcendent value of right and the market. 84 The 
nation, by nature, includes boundaries which the forces of globalization, led by global 
capital, must overcome; at the same time, the nation is crucial to the functioning of global 
capital, for it serves as the force of population regulation and obedience. 
The most pressing problem with regard to illiberal democracies remains the injustice and 
deplorable treatment of state residents, citizens and non-citizens, under so-called 
'democratic' regimes. This problem is a perfect illustration of the conflict between the 
(Schmittian) political nature of democracy and the universalistic desires of liberalism, 
and it is this conflict that makes the injustices occurring under 'democratic' regimes 
somehow acceptable to the international community. 
Zakaria's assertions point to the difficult conceptual connection between democracy (of 
any form) and state legitimacy; moreover, the greater problem here has to do with the 
type of sovereignty acceptable to the liberal world from non-liberal states. That is, the 
greatest fallout from the desire to expand the liberal world through democratic means 
(predominantly in the form of elections) is the increased level of Schmittian sovereignty 
which is overlooked in the interest of preserving electoral democracy which, as Zakaria 
84 For information and sources on the United Nations' involvement with, support of, and 
reliance on the international market see www.un.org/Pubslbusiness. See 
www.un.org/partnerslbusiness/index.asp, which lists (among others) the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as allied agencies in helping to further the UN 
Millennium Development Goals. 
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comments, 'trumps' everything (see epigraph). The liberal West seems content to allow 
'democratic' dictatorships or absolutist regimes to engage in the global market so long as 
state sponsored elections are held or the trappings of democracy are in place. 
The reason why liberal democracies arguably 'work' in terms of liberal requirements for 
what Rawls calls 'decency' has to do with the ensured predominance of liberalism over 
democracy within the state. Clearly, it is this ensured predominance which allows for the 
argument that illiberal democracies do not 'work' in the eyes of the international 
community. Tautologically, states without a liberal tradition cannot possibly have a 
predominance of constitutional liberalism to outweigh the political force of democracy. 
It is for this reason that states holding 'free and fair' elections do not, it seems, achieve 
liberalism. The Hobbesian legacy of sovereign legitimation through democratic 
foundation, or social contract, was adopted by states which were already liberal, which 
had in many cases been founded as such, and which were then legitimated by democratic 
functioning. That is, in as much as the social contract resulting from a state of nature 
was, for Hobbes, a myth, the tacit assumption that constitutional liberal states were 
democratically founded is false. 85 In all cases a democratic state was founded by the 
sovereign power of what would become a constitutional liberal society, then legitimated 
85See T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (London: 
Longman, 1986), p. 73-80; and Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: 
Republicanism, Liberalism, and the Law (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 1998), for 
readings of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (26 August, 1789) and American 
republicanism at the time of the drafting of the US Constitution. 
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by democracy. The state, thus far, has always arrived before the people, 
constitutionalism in the hands of the few before legitimating election by the multitude. 
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Conclusion 
The eighteenth century conceptions of nationality and popular sovereignty may be called 
the 'embryo of totalitarianism' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 113) - in these, we see the 
preservation of absolute sovereign power (usually in the monarchy), transferred to a 
concept of national sovereignty. The nation-state and its ideological structures create and 
reproduce the understood homogeneity of the people through the power of the sovereign 
decision. The mechanism of sovereignty that produces the 'other', the 'excluded', with 
boundaries that delimit and support the sovereign body is always intimately related to the 
production of crisis, the state of emergency. 
Chandran Kukathas has argued that the liberal state (in its Hobbesian form) exists solely 
to uphold the law and to ensure the life and safety of the people it rules (Kukathas, 1998). 
As such, a state that is truly liberal has no conceptual or political trouble with 
multiculturalism, but does not consider the subject part of its duty or reign of power, so 
long as the citizens are protected from one another. But this is a position that doesn't 
represent the liberal philosophical position as it is normally presented. As Duncan Kelly 
observes, such a position understands liberalism, philosophically, as "uninterested in the 
identity of particular groups or their various struggles" (Kelly, 2000: 32). Indeed, even 
this version of the Hobbesian liberal state (and form of rule) has never actually existed 
outside of normative theory. Hobbes himself was motivated, if not by conflicting cultural 
groups, then by a desire to minimize conflict and strife within the state in general -
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sovereign claims on religious choice, on language and expression, on every public matter, 
were clearly absolute for Hobbes. In any case, today, many 'cultural communities' (most, 
perhaps) continue to struggle for appropriate recognition within liberal democratic states 
(and often for survival and freedom from persecution within non-liberal, Hobbesian 
sovereign states). Charles Taylor has argued that the state must be understood to have a 
role in recognizing and protecting the rights of minority cultures, especially the right of 
cultural groups to the actual survival of their communities (Taylor, 1996). 
As these relatively polar examples illustrate, many of the answers to the question of 
whether liberal democracies are able to recognize minority/cultural groups focus on the 
formulation of possible modes of balancing state-society relations such that both cultural 
diversity (pluralism) and political unity are valued and represented (Kelly, 2000: 32). 
These formulations help us to locate, quite specifically, the limitations of liberal 
democracy regarding multicultural citizenship. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
claims to peoplehood give claims to (usually) national identity, with all of the normative 
force of nationhood. (And the claims to peoplehood and nationhood continue to rise.) 
For Schmitt, a 'people' is a domain of the political insofar as it is a realm in which the 
'us' is differentiated from the 'them', the 'friends' from the 'enemies'. I hold that the 
'nation' is the political (that is, politics and not 'the political') domain of the people. 
The conceptual entities and their real resultant bodies are engaged in an interactive 
relationship with one another; the 'people' "founds" the nation, the nation creates the 
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terms of the people, the people imbibes these, has them inscribed, and reflects a 'national 
identity/personality', and the nation is portrayed as the necessary political representative 
of the 'will of the people'. The result is not only an 'ethnicization', to use Balibar's 
term, of both the 'people' and those not included in the 'people', but also a formulation of 
national sovereignty, conceptually founded by the people and equally conceptually 
legitimating that state which will respect, respond, and reflect the national identity. The 
'people' must be exclusionary, and the 'nation' must be that political body which 
possesses the people's sovereignty. The people in their everyday lives, are not 
conceptualized as politically engaged, by liberal standards, in which the people is 
understood to be a phenomenon existing more in the private domain than the public, 
insofar as the existence of a people is not deemed properly 'political'. But there is a 
recognition of the fact that 'peoples' have political needs and requirements, and the 
nation functions as the mode in which the 'people' are, even in liberalism, properly 
political. 
For all theories based upon Hobbesian sovereignty, the need remains for a political 
authority to make the decision about what the rules of society will be. The people do not 
decide directly on these rules. Even liberal democracy, 11 whose ideal aims might well be 
delineated philosophically as liberty and equality for all under a minimal state 11 , is 
another specific mode of political organization 11 Whose democratic impulses are surely 
not the limits of human potentialities 11 (Kelly, 2000: 37). Liberalism and democracy, if 
not in direct violation of one another, as Schmitt would have us believe, are at the very 
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least unequal players in liberal democratic political formation. Liberalism has long been 
the dominant power. The commitment, as we saw in Zakaria, to democracy in the West 
is, at least rhetorically, indubitable. But as Kelly notes, in terms of political organization, 
our interest in maintaining capitalist networks (and the liberal ability to accomplish this) 
has always ensured that our commitment to democracy has remained 'skin deep' (Kelly, 
2000: 37). We can clearly see this in the rise of other (illiberal, non-liberal) democracies. 
But there are other reasons why liberalism and democracy do not 'blend' so well as we 
may think. Democracy among equal citizens is a notion distinct to a given set of beliefs 
about the world and moral requirements that are found predominantly in nations with 
traditions of Western philosophy, religion, economics, and the resulting political 
formations. As Kelly expresses it, "its arrangements cannot simply be tacked on to any 
old country" (Kelly, 2000: 37); we have seen in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former 
Soviet Union, the mixed results of the forced application of democracy -- while some 
have been positive, some have been tragic. Some political power, some monopoly of 
decision is still the final word in the rules of association. This power does not come from 
the people so long as it exists within the framework of liberal democratic and 
representatively governed nation-states. (Even if this power is legitimated through 
reference to 'the people', 'the nation', and so forth, as it so often is). And it is often 
impossible to imagine that the rules of a given civil association could be effectively 
transformed into even an idealized form of liberalism; to imagine that liberal democratic 
societies could firmly hold the liberal tenets of real liberty and real equality. To remedy 
this would require a means by which to remedy and dissolve the massive inequalities 
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inherent to the capitalist system. The real equality required for a fully functional 
democracy is inaccessible to those members of many liberal societies with neither 
monetary nor intellectual capital. Until these issues are properly addressed, it is likely 
that attempts to formulate even a left liberalism that is practically tenable will stay out of 
reach. 
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